

Department of Politics



**The
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New War

A Comparative Analysis of the Three Recent Afghan Conflicts

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Abstract:

The concept of "new war" explains the characteristics of contemporary civil conflicts. Even though "'new war'" has been subject to various interpretations, this theory helps to understand the changed nature of intrastate warfare in terms of the factors behind the war: politics of warfare, economy of war, military tactics and strategies. Mary Kaldor, who has conducted research in the Balkans and Iraq, explained 'new war' as a mixture of non-state and transnational actors who weakens states through struggle for particularistic objectives. She has concluded that new war economy is affected by factors emerged from globalization and transnational networks. Furthermore, in contemporary civil warfare, diverse military units commit atrocious and criminal acts in order to pursuit their goals. In this dissertation, the concept of the 'new war' will be explored taking into account the past three-decade of conflict in Afghanistan. Further, it will analyze and compare the chronological changes in certain features of political economy, political behavior, and military characteristics of the three recent wars of Afghanistan: the anti-Soviet insurgency, the civil war after the Soviet withdrawal, and finally, the recent Taliban (neo-Taliban) re-emergence. This in order to examine whether or not there has been a considerable change in the key features of war to support the 'new war' theory.

Introduction:

Carl Von Clausewitz conducted the first analytical study of war in his masterpiece 'On War'. The war, in his terms, was a means for strengthening and centralizing state administrations and economy. Clausewitz depicted war as a tool for pursuing rational and mainstream political ideas.¹ As time passed, global development of technology, communication and transportation enhanced military capacity of para-state actors which negatively affected the state administration and its monopoly over violence. Herfried Munkler calls these new actors "military entrepreneurs".² New military and economic factors complicated and changed the nature of mainstream and classical wars which were controlled by state politicians, commanded by army generals, and fought by well-equipped and disciplined soldiers.

The concept of "new war" implies that the contemporary conflicts are far more complicated to be analyzed through a classical Clausewitzian school of thought. Therefore, it is necessary to explore contemporary security dilemmas from a new perspective. This requires analyzing the development of certain characteristics of economical, political and military aspects of wars in specific case studies.

There are three major thesis regarding change in the nature of warfare. The first one states that various non-state actors connected to or affected by supra-state and transnational networks, conduct war for narrow and particularistic objectives. The security threats resulted from the non-state feature of new wars extends beyond the state boundaries.³ The second argument indicates that contemporary high technology – Revolution in military Affairs (RMA) – used by the certain military units has changed the balance of war in favour of the owners of the technology, like the West.⁴ The third thesis suggests that the war is a post-modern phenomenon highly linked with the media, internet, and computer screens rather than with reality.⁵

¹ Clausewitz, Carl Van(1993) *On War*, Translated by Michael Howard and Peter Paret, London: Everyman's Library: p.99

² Munkler, Herfried (2005) *The New Wars*, UK: Polity Press, p.1

³ Angstrom, Jan(2006) 'Introduction', in Isabelle Duyvesteyn & Jan Angstrom, *Rethinking the Nature of War*, USA: Frank Cass, pp.1-18

⁴ Ibid., pp.1-18

⁵ Ibid., pp.1-18

This dissertation will analyze changes in certain political, economic and military aspects of war in the context of the first thesis of intrastate warfare that undermine state and destabilize society through crime, atrocities and fear. Although single cases of conflicts in the Balkans, Iraq, Somalia and others have been analyzed in terms of the new features of war, it is required to systematically analyze the development of change in the political economy of war and the military aspects in a single geopolitical unit. Such study will comparatively evaluate the development of these changes. This study will provide answers to the following questions: 1) to what extent has there been a change in the nature of warfare in a geopolitical unit (country)? 2) Was there a shift in the nature of warfare after the end of the Cold War in the 1990s? 3) To what extent can a thematic study of the new war explain these changes?

Questions may arise about the practical significance of such political analysis of warfare. The concept of the 'new war' provides a more detailed and comprehensive analysis on the politics, economy, and modes of warfare of recent conflicts. This concept is interrelated with the appearance of the recent globalization trends and transnational networks that have largely affected the global, regional and national security. This research will contribute to the study of war as a combination of economic, political and military phenomenon, and would be useful in understanding the wider factors, impacts and consequences of contemporary conflicts. It will further assist to find recommendations and conclusions for tackling contemporary security dilemmas.

Afghanistan has been a ground for continuous and *interrelated* intervals of wars during the last three decades, thus it is an ideal context to analyze the shift in the nature of wars. The relevance of this research is further emphasized by the fact that Afghan conflicts are shaped by local, regional, transnational and global factors. Edward Walker refers to the Afghan conflicts as a complex of "national liberation, a holy war, an ethnic or tribal conflict, a civil war, and an interstate war".⁶

⁶Walker, Edward (2006), 'Ethnic War, Holy War, War O' War: Does the Adjective Matter in Explaining Collective Political Violence?', University of California, Barkley, East European and Eurasian Studies, http://repositories.cdlib.org/iseees/bps/2006_01-walk, p.22

The state in Afghanistan was established in 1747, by Pashton tribal elites in Kandahar. Since then, there have always been tribal and ethnic unrests that resisted the domination of a centralized state. The British forces failed to fully colonize the country through the three Anglo-Afghan wars, in the nineteenth and twentieth century. The recent series of wars, which will be explored in this research, started in April 1978 after a coup by the communist party that overthrew the ruling regime, and by the Soviet military invasion in December of the following year. This caused a nationwide popular rebellion which ended in the withdrawal of the Soviets and collapse of the Communist regime in 1989 and 1992 respectively. Contrary to their military achievements, more than a dozen anti-Soviet rebellion parties and former militia units, failed to consent on a common state-building agenda. Moreover, their struggle for power and resources, based on particular sectarian and identity-based interests, resulted in a decade of a bloody civil war. The Taliban, who had emerged as a result of the civil chaos, alleged to centralize power and reinstate the Pashton dominated state. However, the Taliban who took the power in 1996 failed to deal with the demands of the international community and were overthrown by US-led military assault in November 2001. The US assaulted the Taliban regime after they refused delivering Usama Bin Ladin, a Saudi exiled millionaire and accused of plotting the September 11 terrorist attacks. The Taliban were defeated after a brief military operation when the US and the West supported the establishment of a new government. Even though the Taliban were driven off from power, they gradually succeeded to reorganize and disrupt governance and development through insurgent activities.⁷

The three Afghan wars, which will be studied in this research, are: 1) the Anti-Soviet popular rebellion, 2) the 1990s civil war and 3) the Taliban re-emergence as insurgents since 2002.

Theoretical Framework:

Kaldor has comprehensively analyzed the political, military and economical dimensions of the 'new wars' and she believes that the nature of politics, economy and

⁷ The facts in this paragraph were taken from the following sources: Dorransoro, Gilles (2005) *Revolution Unending: Afghanistan: 1979 to the Present*, UK: C. Hurst & Co. Publishers, pp. xv-xvii & Peter Marsden (2002) *The Taliban: War and Religion in Afghanistan*, UK: Zed Books, pp.vi-7 for detailed military history of Afghanistan see Stephen Tanner (2009) *Afghanistan, A Military History from Alexander the Great to the War against Taliban*, US: Da Capo Press,

mode of warfare has recently changed in the post-Cold War conflicts. In the centre of this argument lies the difficulty to distinguish between the private and military, the local and global actors, legitimate organized violence and organized crime, and combatants and non-combatants in the new armed conflicts. The author further argues that the 'new wars' can no longer represent the classical Clausewitzian three-level paradigm of politicians, generals, and soldiers.⁸

Further, this author has distinguished the novel characteristics of the 'new warfare and has pointed out the role of para-state actors in the contemporary conflicts. In this context, the 'new war' is a result of the politico-economic and socio-political transformations, attributed to the end of the Cold War and the new era of globalization.⁹ Kaldor makes concrete and linear distinctions between the old and new wars in terms of the mode of warfare, economy of war, and the motivation of the warring parties and assumes cosmopolitanism as a solution to replace the particularistic and exclusive identity politics.¹⁰

As opposed to classic wars, the state no longer plays an important political and economical role, and has lost its power due to the emergence of numerous non-states and transnational, such as foreign mercenary, contractors, criminal networks, NGOs and militias.¹¹ Kaldor calls this decline of power as a "central contrast between old and new wars" which is due to an upward integration into suprastate arrangements and downward fragmentation to non-state units.¹² Decline in the state's legitimacy and power is considered another factor behind the 'new wars'. The end of the Cold War, which unravelled the ideological failure in some regions and/or removed superpower back-ups from the dominated states, is also a significant factor for the emergence of 'new wars'.¹³ Kaldor argues that conflicts during the Cold War were

⁸Kaldor, Mary (1999), 'The Structure of Conflict' In L. Wohlegemuth, S. Gibson, S. Klasen and E. Rothschild. Uppsala, *Common Security and Civil Society in Africa*, Nordiska Afrikainstitutet, p.120 & Kaldor, Mary (2006) *New and Old War: Organized Violence in a Global Era*, UK: Polity Press, p.2

⁹Kaldor, Mary (2006) *New and Old War*, UK: Polity Press, pp.1-15

¹⁰ Ibid., pp.1-15

¹¹Ibid., p.119

¹²Ibid., p.122

¹³ Kaldor, Mary (2006) *New and Old War: Organized Violence in a Global Era*, UK: Polity Press, pp.1-15

harbingers for the current 'new wars'.¹⁴ She recommends that any cosmopolitan elites in the conflicts zones should be promoted by the transnational and international organizations in order to influence as "oil spots" the particularists and exclusivists. State building, rule of law and monopolizing the legitimate use of force are also part of the recommended solutions.¹⁵

Three key features of the 'new wars' will be discussed in this research. The first one is the significance of identity politics, rather than ideology, in the new wars. The second is the illicit and complicated war economy. Finally, the new modes of warfare including the diversity of troops, atrocities, plunder and mass civilian casualties.

In terms of the politics of the war, the parties involved in the contemporary warfare fail or don't tend to promote an ideological cause.¹⁶ In other words, most of the warring groups pursue ethnically narrow or religiously sectarian¹⁷ objectives. The war is not a means for achieving political ends, as defined by Clausewitz, but an end in itself.¹⁸ The parties in conflict may wage war in the name of past victories, achievements, or monarchs.¹⁹

Further, the economy of the 'new wars' is transnational and criminalized, these are fuelled by illicit means such as drugs, kidnapping and looting. Resources in the new wars flow through complex and multi-actor networks, and beyond state borders. These resources are used by combatants and also by shadow (opportunist) entrepreneurs.²⁰ Illicit economical sources such as drug dealing, illegal extraction of natural resources and looting are widely used.²¹

¹⁴ Kaldor, Mary (1999), 'The Structure of Conflict' In L. Wohlegemuth, S. Gibson, S. Klasen and E. Rothschild. Uppsala, *Common Security and Civil Society in Africa*, Nordiska Afrikainstitutet, p.122 & Kaldor, Mary (2006) *New and Old War: Organized Violence in a Global Era*, UK: Polity Press, pp.16-33

¹⁵ Kaldor, Mary (2006) *New and Old War: Organized Violence in a Global Era*, UK: Polity Press, pp.11

¹⁶ Ibid., pp.1-15

¹⁷ Religiously sectarian politics refers to promoting factions within a religion. For example Islamic groups pursue Shi'ite and Sunni identities rather than Islamic mainstream ideologies.

¹⁸ Kaldor, Mary (2006) *New and Old War: Organized Violence in a Global Era*, UK: Polity Press, pp.1-15

¹⁹ Ibid., p.6

²⁰ Goodhand, Jonathan(2005) 'Frontiers and Wars: the Opium Economy in Afghanistan', *Journal of Agrarian Change*, Vol.5, No.2, p. 199-216 & Kaldor, Mary (2006) *New and Old War: Organized Violence in a Global Era*, UK: Polity Press, pp.95-119

In terms of the operational and military aspects of the war, militant groups in the new warfare are diverse. In addition to regular armies, paramilitaries such as mercenaries, contractors, foreign volunteers, transnational networks and many other actors are engaged in the warfare. Therefore, it is difficult to distinguish between the combatant and non-combatant, between the guerrilla fighter and the peasant, and between the police officer and the mercenary.²² Since most military units are not bound by a military discipline, they try to achieve particular ends by atrocious means.

It is worth mentioning that the concept of the 'new war' is in no way an absolute phenomenon and that this dissertation may not produce a concrete result about whether or not the conflicts here analyzed are old or new. However, this analysis will help to point out the extent to which the recent Afghan conflicts resemble the features of the 'new war'. Furthermore, it will help to assess the development of new politics, new war economy and new modes of warfare in these conflicts.

There has been a great deal of theoretical and empirical research about the novelty in the characteristics of wars and the factors behind it. Although it will be beyond the scope and limit of this paper to analyze all of them, the following summary will explore in general these concepts and viewpoints in order to construct a theoretical framework.

Some authors criticise Kaldor's concept of 'new war' as intrastate conflicts. Bob de Graff for example, has argued that the post-Cold War intrastate conflicts –particularly those in the Balkans to which Kaldor refers to in her research—were actually tensions among states in a new manner because each warlord and ethnic group was manipulated by one of the neighbouring states.²³

Other authors are sceptical about the dichotomous and linear changes in the characteristics of war and argue that several features of the 'new war' can be found in

²¹Kaldor, Mary (2006) *New and Old War: Organized Violence in a Global Era*, UK: Polity Press, pp.95-119

²²Ibid., pp.1-15

²³De Graff, Bob(2006) 'The Wars in Former Yugoslavia in the 1990s: bringing the States Back in', in Isabelle Duyvesteyn & Jan Angstrom, *Rethinking the Nature of War*, USA: Frank Cass, pp.159-172

a historical study of old civil wars. Edward Newman argues that the linear and dichotomous distinctions between the old and 'new wars' are overstated perhaps by the increasing role of the media in contemporary conflicts.²⁴ He denies the chronological development in the nature and purpose of the warfare and proposes a further comprehensive and in-depth historical analysis.²⁵ Stathis Kalyvas also defers from the dichotomy in the study of new and old wars and examines three significant features of new wars –the criminalization and dispersed violence, the lack of popular support for conflicts, and private motivation of the warlords– and asserts that these can also be found in most of the old civil wars.²⁶ This author further asserts that the 'new wars' share some features with the old intrastate wars and recommends a "sustained, systematic, and long-term observation" based on historical facts.²⁷ On the other hand, Bethany Lacina argues that the only significant characteristic of the new or post-Cold-War conflicts is their wide publicity and increased global attention through developed media and technology.²⁸

A number of researchers have a different perception about the terminology. Stephen Metz for example, argues that the new wars are fought for commercial and spiritual goals.²⁹ Others like Benjamin Lambeth and Grant Hammond use the concept of 'new war' to refer to the use of high military technology and precise weapons which reduces unnecessary casualties.³⁰ In this context, the war has become efficient in terms of human and material resources, and time.³¹ This innovation is called Revolution in the Military Affairs (RMA), usually used to refer to American wars on the Iraqi and Taliban regimes.³² However, this concept is narrow and cannot examine most of the contemporary wars. Other authors focus on the economic aspect and argue

²⁴ Newman, Edward (2004) 'The 'new war's Debate: A Historical Perspective is Needed', *Security Dialogue*, 2004;35;173, Sage, pp.173-189

²⁵ *Ibid.*, pp.173-189

²⁶ Stathis Kalyvas (2001) 'Old and New Civil Wars: a Valid Distinction?', *World Politics*, Vol.54, No.1, pp.99-118

²⁷ *Ibid.*, pp.99-118

²⁸ Lacina, Bethany (2004) 'From Side Show to Centre Stage: Civil Conflict after the Cold War', *Security Dialogue*, Sage: 2004; 35; 191, pp.191-205

²⁹ Metz, Stephen (1994) 'Insurgency after the Cold War', *Small Wars and Insurgencies*, 1743-9558, Vol.5, Issue 1, p.64-80

³⁰ Lambeth, Benjamin (1997) 'The Technology Revolution in Air Warfare', *Survival: Global Politics and Strategy*, 1468-2699, Volume 39, Issue 1, 1997, Pages 65 – 83 Grant Hammand (2001), 'Globalization, Technology, and the Transformation of the Security Environment: The Real Revolution in Military Affairs', paper presented at APSA: Aug 2001 cited in Isabelle Duyvesteyn & Jan Angstrom, *Rethinking the Nature of War*, USA: Frank Cass, p.135

³¹ *Ibid.*, p.135

³² *Ibid.*, p.135

that the new wars are exclusively used for economic purposes. As David Keen argues, "war may be a continuation of economics by other means".³³

Some analysts have provided systematic and detailed explanations on the factors that underlie the 'new wars'. According to Zygmunt Bauman, Mary Kaldor and Martin Shaw, economic globalization and its related forces have been the major factors of the 'new war', as it has eroded the state power and its monopoly over legitimate organized violence and top-down state economy.³⁴ Other perspectives reject novelty and cause-effect explanation for the 'new wars' and propose a detailed analysis of historical and social context for understanding them. Sinisa Malesevic for example, rejects globalization and liberal economic forces as a cause.³⁵ However argues that merely conceptualizing a new paradigm for understanding the post-World War-II social, historical, political, technological and legal context –the change in the concept of territorial conquest, prioritization of soft-politics over coercive expansionism and the UN Charter– would be useful in understanding the nature of the new conflicts.³⁶ Isabelle Duyvesteyn argues that most of the novel characteristics of the 'new wars', which usually occur in developing countries, are due to the weakness of the states and not because of the novel intentions of belligerent parties or a breakthrough technology.³⁷

Methodology:

It is the aim of this dissertation to answer the following research question: To what extent do the key characteristics attributed to the new wars change over time in a single geopolitical unit, country? Further, it will also explore the characteristics that show the extent to which the three recent wars in Afghanistan show a 'new war'

³³ Keen, David (2000) 'Incentives and Disincentives for Violence', in Mats Berdal and David Malone (eds), *Greed and Grievance: Economic Agendas in Civil Wars*, Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, pp.20-41

³⁴ Bauman, Zygmunt (2000) *Liquid Modernity*, Cambridge: Polity Press & Shaw, Martin. (2005) *the New Western Way of War: Risk-Transfer War and Its Crisis in Iraq*. Cambridge & Polity Press & Kaldor, Mary (2006) *New and Old War*, UK: Polity Press

³⁵ Malesevic, Sinisa (2008) 'the Sociology of the 'new war's: Assessing the causes and Objectives of Contemporary Violent Conflicts', *International Political Sociology* (2008) 2, 97–112, pp. 97-110

³⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 97-110

³⁷ Duyvesteyn, Isabelle (2005), 'The Concept of Conventional War and Armed Conflict in Collapsed States' in Isabelle Duyvesteyn & Jan Angstrom, *Rethinking the Nature of War*, USA: Frank Cass, p. 12

phenomenon. In order to provide answer for this question, this dissertation will comparatively analyze the three conflicts which occurred in three consecutive decades: 1) the anti-Soviet conflict of 1980s; 2) the civil war of 1990s; and 3) the neo-Taliban conflict of 2000s. Since a comprehensive analysis of all the features of wars is out of the range of this dissertation, three distinct themes, such as the politics, economy and mode of warfare, and particular characteristics within these, in the context of the Afghan conflicts, will be explored. Each theme will be discussed in a separate chapter.

Gerth and Mills argue that "social science needs to be based on factual description and associative reasoning about reality".³⁸ A great deal of empirical and secondary data from scholastic articles, newspapers and credible reports concerning the recent wars of Afghanistan will be examined. This research will focus on the work of Barnett Rubin, Olivier Roy, William Maley and Anthony Giustozzi, who have comprehensively analyzed the Afghan politics. These sources provide facts and analytical explanation on the change in the nature of Afghan warfare. The empirical facts and secondary materials concerning politics, economy, and mode of warfare will be interpreted and comparatively analyzed across the three conflicts and a thematic conclusion will be drawn at the end of each chapter, in order to show the magnitude and chronology of change in each aspect. A final conclusion will be drawn based on the results obtained from this analysis.

Comparative and thematic study of the three wars would be a useful method because systematic analysis of the development of changes is a significant method for constructing and enhancing knowledge in political science. Hans Keman states that the "comparison is part and parcel of the way we experience reality..."³⁹ A comparative study of the development of certain features of war can demonstrate the changes in the nature of warfare throughout the three decades of conflict in Afghanistan and will also assist to comprehend the extent of the validity of the concept of the "new wars".

³⁸ Gerth, H., and Mills, C.W (eds) (1986) *From Max Weber*, London: Mcmillan cited in Hans Keman, Jan Kleinnijenhuis, Paul Penning (1999) *Doing Research in Political Science*, London: Sage, p.5

³⁹ Keman, Hans, Kleinnijenhuis, Jan, Penning, Paul (1999) *Doing Research in Political Science*, London: Sage, p.3

In general words, the purpose of this comparative study will be two-fold: theoretical and contextual. First, it will help to the development and enhancement of the 'new war' theory and will assist to respond the following questions: 1) to what extent does the 'new wars' demonstrate a linear change in the mode of politics and economy of the warfare?, 2) to what extent are the features, attributed to the 'new war', also observable in the older wars and vice versa?; and 3) what type of war(s) –the Cold War proxy conflict, the civil warfare or the insurgency– can typify the new warfare? Second, comparative analysis contributes to the academic knowledge about the magnitude of change in politics, economy and the military dimensions of the politics of war and crisis in the country and region. It will also facilitate opening new venues for useful strategic, military and diplomatic solutions on the security of the country, region and the world.

In order to ensure that the measurements of research reflect the theoretical concept, three key elements of war (variables or themes) are carefully selected and their change has been systematically analyzed throughout the three decades. In other words, the three wars which took place in the three separate decades –1980s, 1990s and 2000s– are the units of observation, the cases, of this research. The politics, economy and the mode of warfare, on the other hand, are the units of variation, the variables. Change in certain features within these units of variation will be analyzed across the three units of observation, the three decades of war.

The first chapter will analyze the novelty in the politics of war. It will analyze the extent to which the politics of the warfare in the three wars were particularistic or ideological. In other words, it will be studied that whether the parties involved were concerned about narrowly defined religious and ethnic interests or pursued ideologies for changing the society. The role of the legitimacy of the state, erosion of the state power in connection with internal and external factors will also be studied. The second chapter will explore the political economy of war in the context these conflicts. The illicit means for financing wars and the flow of resources through complex and transnational networks are two key aspects of the political economy of the new war. The research will analyze the extent to which the illicit means were used for financing wars across the three decades. The flow of resources among state, non-state and transnational networks will also be examined. The third and last chapter will

examine the new modes of warfare. Changes in the two key features of the mode of warfare, the diversity of force and the atrocious and criminal acts, will be analyzed.

A final and comprehensive conclusion will include the results of the three chapters. The final conclusion will answer the following questions: To what extent are the characteristics of the 'new wars' noticeable in each of the three recent conflicts of Afghanistan? Is there a linear change in the nature of wars in Afghanistan? Which of the three examined aspects show more distinct changes in the nature of war?

Chapter I

The Politics of the 'new war' in the Afghan Conflicts

The new intrastate wars are conflicts of identities as opposed to ideologies. The warring parties pursue particular labels for promotion of sectarian interests. 'New wars' usually take place between groups who have no credible and significant idea for social change and therefore attempt to restore nostalgic autocratic rulings and ethnic dominations.⁴⁰ The warlords claim power based on tribal, linguistic and national identities.⁴¹ They fight for memories rather than ideas. Munkler thinks that ethnic and religious identities are a 'source of mobilization of support' in the new wars.⁴²

Decline in the legitimacy and power of the state is considered both a cause and a consequence of the 'new war'. The impact of globalization, sudden decline in the domination of the superpowers, and the neo-liberal changes have negatively affected the state power which can in turn result in the emergence of particularistic groups that embark on wars for achieving their goals.⁴³ When states lose monopoly over legitimate use of violence, smaller parties take advantage of the situation and struggle among themselves and against the state for achieving particular objectives, resources and power.

While, old wars strengthened state authority and expanded state administrations, new wars emerge from erosion of the state authority and cause a further destruction of state apparatus. It can be suggested that not only erosion of the state power but also a decline in the popular legitimacy of the state plays role in promoting contemporary conflicts.

This chapter will explore the development of particularism and identity-politics during the three recent wars in Afghanistan. This in order to examine the level of

⁴⁰ Kaldor, Mary (2006) *New and Old War: Organized Violence in a Global Era*, UK: Polity Press, pp.73-83

⁴¹ Ibid., pp.73-83

⁴² Munkler, Herfried (2005) *The New Wars*, UK: Polity Press, pp.1-4

⁴³ Kaldor, Mary (2006) *New and Old War: Organized Violence in a Global Era*, UK: Polity Press, pp.1-15

ideology and identity politics in these conflicts, taking into account three aspects: 1) the role of ethnicity; 2) religious factionalism; and 3) the role of state power and its popular legitimacy to understand the extent of the shift in the politics of war during the last three decades.

1.1 Ethnic Particularism:

Afghans define themselves in terms of ethnicity, religion, religious divisions –Shi'ite and Sunni–, tribe, clan and family.⁴⁴ The country is made of several ethnicities such as Pashtun, Tajik, Hazara, Uzbek, Turkmen, Baluch, Nuristani and etc.⁴⁵ Pashtuns , who slightly outnumber the rest, have ruled the country since the establishment of the Afghan state in the sixteenth century (Table-1).⁴⁶ The following section analyzes the role of ethnic and religious particularism and the development of these identities in the three-decade war of Afghanistan.

Pashtun	7,000,000	Concentrated in South and Southeast, but settled in most regions
Tajiks	3,500,000	North, Northeast and Kabul region
Hazaras	1,500,000	Centre (Hazarajat) and Kabul
Uzbeks	1,300,000	North
Aimaq	800,000	West
Farsiwan, Heratis	600,000	West and South
Turkmen	300,000	North
Brahui	100,000	Southwest
Baloch	100,000	West and Northwest
Nuristanis	100,000	East

Table 1: Shows the ethnic distribution of Afghan people⁴⁷

1.1.1- The Anti-Soviet War:

The Afghan insurgency against the Soviets was a combination of grass-root uprising and elite activities (see diagram 2). Almost all tribal, ethnic and linguistic groups participated in the rebellion. The anti-Soviet uprising was supplemented by the elite ideology of Islamism and nationalism. Barnett Rubin calls it a conflict between Islamism with Marxism.⁴⁸ Neamatollah Nojumi calls it a 'chain of mass revolts in the

⁴⁴ Dorronsoro, Gilles (2005) *Revolution Unending: Afghanistan: 1979 to the Present*, UK: C. Hurst & Co. Publishers, p.10

⁴⁵ Hammond, Thomas (1984) *Red Flag over Afghanistan*, US: Westview Press, p.5


⁴⁶ Ibid., p.5

⁴⁷ Hyman, Anthony (1984), *Afghanistan under Soviet Domination, 1964-83*, London, Macmillan, p. 11

⁴⁸ Rubin, Barnett(2002) *the Fragmentation of Afghanistan*, USA: Yale University Press, p.82

form of political revolution'.⁴⁹ Grass-root participation against the ruling Communist party was promoted by the popular ideology of Islam and Nationalism.⁵⁰ The fact that the insurgent parties were dominated by an ethnic group does not suggest that they promoted ethnic interests. (see table-3).⁵¹

It can be, therefore, suggested that rebellion was a popular movement and not an ethnic conflict. The reason for multiplicity of the rebellion groups can be explained in two different ways. First, There was no single and strong leadership to mobilize guerrillas (see diagram 2) from all around the country. Secondly, lack of communication facilities constrained the leaders' efforts to promote a countrywide national movement against the Communist regime. The grass-root tribal revolts gradually integrated into a number of ideological parties that were simultaneously organized in Pakistan.⁵² The religious elites absorbed the guerrilla commanders' into their political organizations.⁵³ Rubin argues that the international actors were also important in the integration of the resistance as he writes: "the resistance ... developed out of the interaction among spontaneous social movements, political elites, and international actors."⁵⁴



⁴⁹ Nojumi, Neamatollah (2002) *The Rise of the Taliban in Afghanistan*, NY: Palgrave, p.208

⁵⁰ Ibid., 11-25

⁵¹ Rubin, Barnett (2002) *the Fragmentation of Afghanistan*, USA: Yale University Press, p.93

⁵² Maley, William (2002), *The Afghanistan Wars*, N.Y: Palgrave, p.61

⁵³ Ibid., p.61

⁵⁴ Rubin, Barnett (2002) *the Fragmentation of Afghanistan*, USA: Yale University Press, p.179

⁵⁵ Maley, William (2002), *The Afghanistan Wars*, N.Y: Palgrave, pp. 58-65 & Rubin, Barnett(2002) *the Fragmentation of Afghanistan*, USA: Yale University Press, p.180,184, 185-190 & Roy, Oliver (1990) *Islam and Resistance in Afghanistan*, NY: Cambridge University Press, pp.110-126

The Afghan uprising during the Soviet invasion was resulted from various factors such as ideological struggle, constructed by spontaneous tribal revolts, mutinies within the national army, national dissatisfaction of the reform policies, urban uprising, initiatives of educated elites, and the ideological efforts of the Pakistan-based Islamist organizations (see Diagram 2).⁵⁶ Oliver Roy indicates the local tribes or *qawms*, as main social actors of Afghan society, contingently initiated the holy war against the Soviets and that most tribes mobilized force in order to compete with the peer *qawms* and that the revolt soon turned to an *ideological struggle*.⁵⁷ Rubin has also pointed out a number of clashes between smaller tribes or *qawms* during the Soviet invasion.⁵⁸ Nevertheless, trivial *qawm*-based clashes were not to an extent to overshadow the nation-wide movement for a unified purpose.

Furthermore, the anti-Soviet rebellion was geographically dispersed and it took place in all ethnic regions simultaneously. There were significant popular revolts in all of the five regions –the central Hazara dominated region, the northern Turkic, the Southern & South Eastern Pashtuns, and the Western Herat– of the country.⁵⁹ It can be suggested that the revolt was geographically and ethnically inclusive and it was constructed by popular, nationalist and Islamic ideology. The ethnic homogeneity of the militant groups and parties was merely for the purpose of internal solidarity and mobilization of support and not for pursuing ethnic goals.

1.1.2- The Civil War:

After the collapse of the Communist Regime in 1992, tense ethnic conflicts took place between the former anti-Soviet rebel groups.⁶⁰ As mentioned before, although, the rebel groups were fragmented, they fought for a common cause of defeating the Soviets and the Communist regime and establishing an Islamic state. However, after the collapse of the Regime these groups advanced ethnic identities as tools to

⁵⁶ Rubin, Barnett(2002) *the Fragmentation of Afghanistan*, USA: Yale University Press, pp.180,184, 185

⁵⁷ Roy, Oliver (1995) *Afghanistan: From Holy War to Civil War*: Princeton: NJ: the Darwin Press, p.63-65,& Roy, Oliver (1990) *Islam and Resistance in Afghanistan*, NY: Cambridge University Press, p.99

⁵⁸ Rubin, Barnett(2002) *the Fragmentation of Afghanistan*, USA: Yale University Press, p.258

⁵⁹ Maley, William (2002), *The Afghanistan Wars*, N.Y: Palgrave, pp. 86-91 & Sliwinski, Marek (1989a), 'Afghanistan: The Decimation of a People', *Orbis*, 33, 1: 39-56, pp. 54-57

⁶⁰ Maley, William (2002), *The Afghanistan Wars*, N.Y: Palgrave, pp. 201-205

maximize power and resources.⁶¹ The ethnic fragmentation increased with the intensification of the civil war. Former Uzbek militia, *Jombesh*, for example, strengthened their force in the Northwest region of Afghanistan.⁶² The Kabul city was also a zone of rivalry between Pashtun and non-Pashtun forces.⁶³ The emergence of Taliban from the Pashtun ethnic group in 1993 aggravated the ethnic tensions. Taliban absorbed two of the prominent Pashtun parties, the Harakat-i-Islami, and the Hezb-i-Islami.⁶⁴ At times, ethnic conflicts resulted in ethnic massacres such as mass killing of hundreds of Hazara civilians by the Taliban in 1998, and around 3000 Pashtun Taliban militants by Uzbek Warlords.⁶⁵

The factors behind the ethnic war can be explained in different ways. Rubin argues that, when the influence of the superpowers seized after the end of the Cold War, the ethnic groups were manipulated by foreign governments. Pakistan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan and Iran respectively supported the Pashtun, Tajik, Uzbek and Hazara groups.⁶⁶ Maley, on the other hand, asserts that the prime cause of the civil war was the elites' disunity within the groups and not the grass-root tensions.⁶⁷ Gillis Dorronsoro and Barfield, in contrast think that the post-Soviet ethnic mobilization was a tactic for pursuing power and resources.⁶⁸ "Armies may be mobilized in Afghanistan to fight as ethnic groups, but they do not fight for the ethnic group." says Barfield.⁶⁹ Therefore, several reasons are responsible for ethnicization of conflict such as elite' disunity, leftovers of the ethnic militias from the Communist regime, and imbalanced ethnic representation in the state. The militias that had been created from minority tribes and ethnicities by the Communist regime were not equipped with an

⁶¹ Maley, William (2002), *The Afghanistan Wars*, N.Y: Palgrave, pp. 201-205

⁶² Dorronsoro, Gilles (2005) *Revolution Unending: Afghanistan: 1979 to the Present*, UK: C. Hurst & Co. Publishers, pp.259-264

⁶³ Rubin, Barnett(2002) *the Fragmentation of Afghanistan*, USA: Yale University Press, pp.266s

⁶⁴ Rashid, Ahmad (2000), *Taliban, The Story of the Afghan Warlords*, Oxford: Pan Books, pp.17-31

⁶⁵ Dorronsoro, Gilles (2005) *Revolution Unending: Afghanistan: 1979 to the Present*, UK: C. Hurst & Co. Publishers, p. 269

⁶⁶ Rubin, Barnett(2002) *the Fragmentation of Afghanistan*, USA: Yale University Press, pp.250-273

⁶⁷ Maley, William (2002), *The Afghanistan Wars*, N.Y: Palgrave, p.196

⁶⁸ Dorronsoro, Gilles (2007) Kabul at War (1992-1996): State, Ethnicity and Social Classes, *South Asia Multidisciplinary Academic Journal* [Online], Research Articles, Online since 14 October 2007, Connection on 10 June 2009. URL : <http://samaj.revues.org/index212.html> & Dorronsoro, Gilles (2005) *Revolution Unending: Afghanistan: 1979 to the Present*, UK: C. Hurst & Co. Publishers, pp.258-259

⁶⁹ Barfield, Thomas (2005), Afghanistan is Not the Balkans: Ethnicity and its Political Consequences from a Central Asian: Perspective, *Central Eurasian Studies*, Vol.4, No.1, p.8

ideological motivation. Therefore boosting regional power was the only option for the survival of these groups.

1.1.3- The Neo-Taliban Insurgency:

Despite the fact that the neo-Taliban forces are made of Pashtuns from the southern, eastern and southwestern Afghanistan, they don't promote ethnic interests. That is because there is a difference between ethnic homogeneity and ethnic motivation in conflict. Some groups may be ethnically homogenous while, they would pursue an ideologically constructed cause. Although, Taliban forces are 95% Pashtuns – ethnically homogenous–, their main purpose of revolt is the re-establishment of a religious dictatorship based on the Deobandi⁷⁰ ideology.⁷¹ Neo-Taliban, according to some reports, receives support even from some non-Pashtun ethnicities. Hazaras in Ghazni province, as an example, provided support to the Taliban.⁷² Furthermore, an ethnically inclusive clergy network supported the Taliban Regime in 2006, as most Mullahs openly approved the rebellion of the Taliban in the mosques in many areas of Afghanistan, including the provinces where non-Pashtun ethnicities are the majority.⁷³ Furthermore, Taher Yoldash, an Uzbek warlord, is also militarily supporting the Taliban in the Northern provinces as well as near the Pakistan boarder.⁷⁴ Seth Jones argues that the Taliban mobilize force for fundamentalist ideological change and there is no evidence that the main motive has been a revival of pure Pashtun state, or ethnic dominance.⁷⁵ Some, specially the US force authorities in Afghanistan, link the neo-Taliban's forces with the Ghilzai⁷⁶ tribal faction Pashtun.⁷⁷ However, there were more Durrani members than the Ghilzais in the Leadership Council of the Taliban in a 2004 report.⁷⁸ There is another argument that the Taliban receive support form the local tribes within the rural areas. However, their approach

⁷⁰Deobandi is a fundamental movement that emphasizes on observing fanatical and religious rules about women, music, and even very private individual behaviors of Muslims.

⁷¹ Giustozzi, Antonio (2007), *Koran, Kalashnikov, and Laptop: the Neo-Taliban Insurgency in Afghanistan*, UK: Hurst Publishers, pp.12-15

⁷² Ibid., p.48

⁷³ Ibid., pp.45-46

⁷⁴ Benawa Pashto News: Published 26 June, 09, URL: <http://www.benawa.com/details.php?id=27078> translated by Jawaid Samadey-

⁷⁵ Jones, Seth (2008) "The Raise of Afghanistan's Insurgency: State, Failure and Jihad, Vol. 32, No. 4, pp.7-40

⁷⁶ Ghilzai and Durani are the two main divisions of Pashton tribe

⁷⁷ Giustozzi, Antonio (2007), *Koran, Kalashnikov, and Laptop: the Neo-Taliban Insurgency in Afghanistan*, UK: Hurst Publishers, p.47

⁷⁸ Ibid., p.47

to the local tribes is a tactic for opening their way into the villages. There were incidents that the Taliban hunted the elders and tribal leaders down whenever they had refused to cooperate and let the militants in their areas peacefully.⁷⁹

However, absence of large ethnic conflicts does not mean that the neo-Taliban insurgency has not triggered tribal skirmishes. There have been few clashes reported between the Ghilzai and Durrani tribes in the Southern Afghanistan.⁸⁰ For example the conflicts between Ghilzai and Norzai tribes with the Durrani sub-tribes such as Achekzai, Barezai and Popalzais in Uruzgan were simply instigated by the Taliban insurgency.⁸¹ In other places, Taliban took advantage of such tribal clashes and extended their influence. For example during the Alizai and Ishaqzai's conflicts in Helmand, Taliban used the gap and strengthened their power in the area.⁸² There were also clashes between the Tajik Governor of Herat, and Pashtun suburban tribes between 2002 and 2004 in which Taliban dominated the place after the assassination of the leader of one of the two parties.⁸³ As such, Taliban took advantage of the conflict that took place between Uzbek and Pashtun tribal leaders.⁸⁴ However, these ethnic clashes were side-effects of the mainstream neo-Taliban ideological insurgency.

As a result, the ethnic and tribal tensions, which are a form of identity-based wars, took place in different scales during the three decade of war in Afghanistan. The movement against the Soviet invasion was multi-party yet popular and nationwide which was stimulated by patriotic and religious ideology. Tahir Amin called it a *national liberation war*.⁸⁵ Rubin explains it as self-motivated contingent popular rebellion which was supplemented by political leaderships.⁸⁶

⁷⁹Giustozzi, Antonio (2007), *Koran, Kalashnikov, and Laptop: the Neo-Taliban Insurgency in Afghanistan*, UK: Hurst Publishers, pp.50-51

⁸⁰Ibid., p.59

⁸¹Ibid., p.59

⁸²Ibid., p.60

⁸³Giustozzi, Antonio (2007), *Koran, Kalashnikov, and Laptop: the Neo-Taliban Insurgency in Afghanistan*, UK: Hurst Publishers,.., p.60

⁸⁴Ibid., p.133

⁸⁵ Amin, Tahir (1984) 'Afghan Resistance, Past, Present and Future', *Asian Survey*, Vol.24, No.4, p.373

⁸⁶Rubin, Barnett(2002) *the Fragmentation of Afghanistan*, USA: Yale University Press, p.186

The anti-Soviet insurgency assisted in the development of ethnic consciousness amongst the rebel groups.⁸⁷ After the collapse of the Communist regime and the withdrawal of the Soviets, the ethnic contrast among the militant groups increased during the civil war of the 1990s. This ethnic fragmentation was used as a tool for seeking resources and power. In other words, the new identity politics replaced the nationalistic liberation ideology.

Despite the ethnic homogeneity of the neo-Taliban rebels, the current insurgency is an ideological revolt for reinstating the Islamic Emirate. Some of the tribal and ethnic clashes during the current Taliban insurgency are not significant to discredit the ideological course of the insurgency.⁸⁸

The military groups in the civil war sought ethnic means for political ends, and in this sense, it is similar to a new war phenomenon. During the anti-Soviet and the neo-Taliban insurgency, on the other hand, the ethnic and tribal clashes have been in the form of minor and ad-hoc conflicts facilitated by the mainstream ideological struggles.

1.2- Religious Particularism:

1.2.1- Religious Particularism during the Anti-Soviet War:

Religious particularism refers to promoting Shi'ite and Sunni identities rather than mainstream Islamic ideologies. Although each of the anti-Soviet rebellion groups (see table-2) were dominated by one of the two divisions, Shi'ite and Sunni, the Afghan insurgency during the Soviet invasion, was rooted in the core religious ideology.⁸⁹ Religion played two roles in general uprising; first, it was the popular religious motives that triggered the bottom-up rebellion against the non-Muslim invaders which Maley names it a revolt of 'village Islam' or 'uprising of Muslim practitioners'.⁹⁰ Second, the orthodox religious elites, such as *Ulema*, *Sufi*, *Sayed*, and *Mullah*, played

⁸⁷ Maley, William (2002), *The Afghanistan Wars*, N.Y: Palgrave, p.158

⁸⁸ Giustozzi, Antonio (2007), *Koran, Kalashnikov, and Laptop: the Neo-Taliban Insurgency in Afghanistan*, UK: Hurst Publishers, p.48

⁸⁹ Rubin, Barnett(2002) *the Fragmentation of Afghanistan*, USA: Yale University Press, pp.201-225

⁹⁰ Maley, William (2002), *The Afghanistan Wars*, N.Y: Palgrave, pp.59-62

a role in mobilizing fanatic population.⁹¹ The rebels fought for religion and patriotism, called *Jihad*.⁹² Maley summarized this as a "distaste for atheism tended to be reinforced by a concern for both, the independence of Afghanistan as a political unit, and a desire for personal autonomy."⁹³

A. The Sunni Parties:

<i>Name of the party</i>	<i>Final Goal</i>	<i>Ideology</i>	<i>Leader Career</i>	<i>Ethnicity</i>
Hezb-i-Islami	Islamic and Independent State	Islamist	Islamist Activist	Pashtun
Jamiyat-Islami	Islamic and Independent State	Islamist	Mullah & Professor of Islamic Studies	Tajik
Harakat-I Enqelab	Islamic and Independent State	Fundamentalist Islamism	Mullah	Pashtun
Jabhe-yi Nejat	Islamic and Independent State	Conservative Islamism	Pir	Pashtun
Mahaz-I Melli	Islamic and Independent State	Conservative Islamism	Pir	Pashtun
Hezb-I Islami	Islamic and Independent State	Fundamentalist Islamism	Mullah	Pashtun
Ettehad	Islamic and Independent State	Patrimonial	Mullah & Islamic Scholar	Pashtun

B. The Shi'ite Parties

<i>Name of the party</i>	<i>Final Goal</i>	<i>Ideology</i>	<i>Leader Career</i>	<i>Ethnicity</i>
Shura	Islamic and Independent State	Conservative Islamism	Sayyed	Hazara
Nasr	Islamic and Independent State	Islamist	Shaikh	Hazara
Sepah	Islamic and Independent State	Islamist	Shaikh	Hazara
Harakat-i Islami	Islamic and Independent State	Conservative Islamism	Shaikh	Hazara
Mustazaffin	Islamic and Independent State	Islamist	Engineer	Hazara

Table 3: The Afghan insurgents' political parties' religious and ethnic distribution⁹⁴

The table 3 shows that the parties were multiple and diverse in terms of leadership, religious factions, and ethnicity. With the exception of the Mustazaffin party leader,

⁹¹Maley, William (2002), *The Afghanistan Wars*, N.Y: Palgrave, p.202

⁹²Bernard Lewis (1988) *The political Language of Islam*, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, p.73 cited in Maley, William (2002), *The Afghanistan Wars*, N.Y: Palgrave, p.59

⁹³Maley, William (2002), *The Afghanistan Wars*, N.Y: Palgrave, p.60

⁹⁴Dorransoro, Gilles (2005) *Revolution Unending: Afghanistan: 1979 to the Present*, UK: C. Hurst & Co. Publishers, pp.143-154

who was an Engineer, the rest were religious elites.⁹⁵ Nevertheless, these particularistic identities did not hamper their joint cause of defeating the Soviets and the Communist regime. Indeed, the religious identities were used for solidification of the groups and effective mobilization of force from certain religious factions. Oliver Roy states that in order to be a good leader and to promote a change in the Afghan society, one needs to attract the solidarity and trust of a particular society to which he is related.⁹⁶ The diverse and religiously fragmented parties did not, therefore, promote particularistic rights or identities, but, through homogeneity of their groups, maximised social capital for pursuing political goals. In other words, during the Soviet invasion, in spite of distinctive Shi'ite and Sunni fractions, the insurgents fought for mainstream Islamic ideology.

1.2.2- Religious Particularism during the Civil War:

After the withdrawal of the Soviet forces and the collapse of the Communist regime respectively in 1989 and 1992, the rebels' mission was completed. The former guerrilla militants and parties therefore embarked on religiously particular identities for seizing power and resources. In the war between the Shi'ite and Sunni factions in Kabul during 1992-1995, thousands of Sunni and Shi'ite civilians were massacred by the militants from the opposite factions in the name of religious identity.⁹⁷ The clashes between Sunni and Shi'ite groups also aggravated to an extent that the Kabul city was divided into Shi'ite and Sunni areas and the belligerent groups were indiscriminately shelled residential areas.⁹⁸ The Taliban, who were from the Sunni branch, massacred hundreds of Shi'ite civilians in the Northern city of Mazar in 1998.⁹⁹ Neighboring states also promoted religious particularism. Iran provided political and military support to the Shi'ite groups and so did Saudi and Pakistan to Sunni groups.¹⁰⁰

1.2.3- Neo-Taliban and Religious Particularism:

⁹⁵ Dorransoro, Gilles (2005) *Revolution Unending: Afghanistan: 1979 to the Present*, UK: C. Hurst & Co. Publishers, pp.143-154

⁹⁶ Roy, Oliver (1989), 'Afghanistan, Back to Tribalism or on to Lebanon?', *Third World Quarterly*, Vol.11, No. 4, Ethnicity in the World Politics, pp.70-71

⁹⁷ Dorransoro, Gilles (2005) *Revolution Unending: Afghanistan: 1979 to the Present*, UK: C. Hurst & Co. Publishers, pp.143-154

⁹⁸ *Ibid.*, pp.250-251

⁹⁹ *Ibid.*, p.200

¹⁰⁰ Rubin, Barnett(2002) *the Fragmentation of Afghanistan*, USA: Yale University Press, pp.251-252

Although, the re-emerged Taliban are from the Sunni faction, there is no evidence that they pursue particular Sunni identity. According to the report of the International Council on Security and Development there were almost no incidents of attacks and casualties in the areas where Shi'ite Muslims reside.¹⁰¹ The report says that almost no casualties and incidents have been recorded, for instance, in the Shiite mainland, Bamiyan.¹⁰² The re-emerged Taliban don't pursue Sunni particularism and nor do the Shi'ite population flag Shi'ite identity against the Sunni insurgents.

It can be suggested from this section that the popular and grass-root motivation for the holy war, *Jihad*, overshadowed the religious and ethnic fragmentation of the insurgent groups during the Soviet invasion. Furthermore, the rebel groups shared a common ideological and patriotic objective. However, in the aftermath of the withdrawal of the foreign forces and the collapse of the Kabul regime in 1992, specific Shi'ite and Sunni groups, --similar to the ethnic clashes-- focused on their religious factions. In other words, fulfillment of their ideological cause after the Cold War faced the rebel groups to rethink their identities. They embarked on, therefore, flagging religious labels for pursuing resources, territories and political power. This period therefore seems new in terms of religious and ethnic particularism. During the neo-Taliban insurgency, in contrast, there are no evident clashes between the Sunni and Shi'ite religious groups and therefore no religious particularism is ostensibly pursued.

Sustained conflicts may change over time. For example a nationalist rebellion movement may turn into an ethnic tension or a religious fundamentalist struggle.¹⁰³ This can explain the change in the Afghan conflicts. The Afghan conflict changed from an ideological popular movement against the Soviets to an identity-based conflict during the civil war and again to a religious ideological insurgency of the neo-Taliban. The anti-Soviet rebellion was driven by the ideology of Islam and

¹⁰¹International Council on Security and Development, Areas of Taliban presence in Afghanistan plus fatal violent incidents in 2008 - November 2008 < <http://www.icosmaps.net/>>

¹⁰² ICOS (2008), Struggle for Kabul: The Taliban Advance Areas of Taliban presence in Afghanistan plus fatal violent incidents in 2008, London < http://www.icosgroup.net/documents/Struggle_for_Kabul_ICOS.pdf >

¹⁰³Walker, Edward (2006), 'Ethnic War, Holy War, War O' War: Does the Adjective Matter in Explaining Collective Political Violence?', University of California, Barkley, East European and Eurasian Studies, http://repositories.cdlib.org/iseees/bps/2006_01-walk

reinstatement of a popular Islamic state. The withdrawal of the Soviets and the collapse of the Regime fulfilled the ideological cause of the rebellions but they couldn't succeed to share power and build a functioning state. The ethnically quasi-homogenous former guerrilla groups had no choice but to use ethnic and religious labels to mobilize force and sustain military operations for seizing power and resources. In contrary to the civil war there is no evidence that the neo-Taliban forces pursue religious particularism.

1.3. State, Legitimacy and Globalization:

There is a close relationship between the new wars, state power and state legitimacy. Kaldor argues that the 'new wars' weakens state and undermines its legitimacy.¹⁰⁴ While, old wars directly assisted in the state-building through enhancing taxation, production and administrations, 'new wars' undermine state power through criminal and illicit economical activities, deliberate atrocities, and complicated, transnational, dynamic and non-state resource-flow networks.¹⁰⁵ In other words, traditional warfare strengthens the state power and national cohesion whilst the new wars, disintegrate and fragmentize the nation-state and national identity. The 'new wars' undermine vertical nationalistic hierarchies of the states through allowing transnational, para-state actors to compete with the state apparatus. A vicious cycle (see diagram 3b) can explain this pattern; that is to say the 'new wars' disintegrate the state systems, and the eroded state in turn provides the ground for wars.




Diagram (3b): shows a vicious cycle of "New" War and State Power relations

¹⁰⁴ Kaldor, Mary (2005), 'Elaborating the "new war" thesis' in Isabelle Duyvesteyn & Jan Angstrom, *Rethinking the Nature of War*, USA: Frank Cass, p. 212

¹⁰⁵ Steward, Frances, FitzGerald, Valpy (2001) *War and Under Development*, NY: Oxford University Press, p.3

1.3.1- Anti-Soviet War and the State:

The Democratic Republic of Afghanistan (DRA), which took power through a military coup, never succeeded to build a strong state and receive popular support and popular legitimacy. The first factor for the erosion of the state was the economic and political instability of the state and its dependence on the external aid and soviet resources.¹⁰⁶ The state lost track of trade and land taxation which had always been the main source of state revenues. Government tax income in 1980-81 was as low as 0.04 per cent of the state expenditures.¹⁰⁷ Secondly, lack of internal cohesion and a split between Khalq and Parcham factions of the ruling party, the People Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA), at the level of the leadership of the party, army and public offices, destabilized the state.¹⁰⁸ Thirdly, the regime had also lost its *Islamic* legitimacy which has always been a fundamental dimension of state in Afghanistan.¹⁰⁹ The presence of the Soviets in the public and military sections overshadowed the efforts of the President of the Communist state who promoted religious administrations and delivered religious speeches.¹¹⁰ The state legitimacy was further aggravated by radical social and agrarian reforms.¹¹¹

Nevertheless, the state kept functioning because of the massive Soviets military and financial aid. Extensive advisory, financial, military and direct intelligence support was sufficient to hold the dummy of the Afghan state upright. The balance of power was also maintained by the support of the two superpower blocs to the both sides of

¹⁰⁶ Rubin, Barnett (1995), *The Fragmentation of Afghanistan*., New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, pp.120-121

¹⁰⁷ Ibid., p.129

¹⁰⁸ Dorronsoro, Gilles (2005) *Revolution Unending: Afghanistan: 1979 to the Present*, UK: C. Hurst & Co. Publishers, pp.173-174 & Fred Halliday, and Zahir Tanin (1998), 'The Communist Regime in Afghanistan 1978-1992: Institutions and Conflicts', *Europe-Asia Studies*, 50, 8, p.18 cited in Maley, William (2002), *The Afghanistan Wars*, N.Y: Palgrave, p.95

¹⁰⁹ Rubin, Barnett (2002), *The Fragmentation of Afghanistan*., New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, p.125-126

¹¹⁰ Halliday, Fred, and Tanin, Zahir (1998), 'The Communist Regime in Afghanistan 1978-1992: Institutions and Conflicts', *Europe-Asia Studies*, 50, 8, p.18 cited in Maley, William (2002), *The Afghanistan Wars*, N.Y: Palgrave, p.95 & Rubin, Barnett (2002), *The Fragmentation of Afghanistan*., New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, p.136

¹¹¹ Hyman, Anthony (1984), *Afghanistan Under Soviet Domination, 1964- 83*, London: McMillan Press Ltd., pp.99-121 & P. Marsden (2002), *The Taliban: War and Religion in Afghanistan*, London, Zed Books., pp.23-24

the war.¹¹² According to Rubin, this balance was a "tensions between state and society into a part of the struggle between East and West."¹¹³

1.3.2- State during the Civil War:

During the post-Soviet civil war, the state power was significantly eroded through violent intrastate conflicts. This destruction of the state was facilitated by international factor. After the end of the Cold War, the country lost its important position as a buffer zone between the two blocs. "Afghanistan lost the strategic position it previously enjoyed as a buffer state, and to an extent reverted to its previous position as a transmission zone with open borders crossed by trade routes"¹¹⁴ said Jonathan Goodhand. Steve Coll interpreted the state weakness as "the Cold War's downward spiral" which occurred due to the release of the superpowers' support of the state.¹¹⁵

Ethnic regionalization and decentralization of power also considerably declined the state power.¹¹⁶ During the civil war, the state power was limited to the capital, Kabul. As Rich says about the erosion of developing states after the cold war "... (States) lack anything more than 'judicial' sovereignty and can only sporadically impress their authority outside the capital and major towns. Many are threatened with a variety of ethnic and religiously-based secessionist movements."¹¹⁷ Local ethnic forces had dominated regional administrations.¹¹⁸ For instance, Ismail Khan, a Tajik warlord, in the Heart city established an autonomous administrative and military stronghold.¹¹⁹ Other Tajik groups organized a power stronghold in Panjshir valley and so did Uzbeks in the North and Pashtuns in the eastern regions.¹²⁰ Rubin points out the role of neighboring states, who shared identity with certain groups, in boosting the ethnic

¹¹² Rubin, Barnett(2002) *the Fragmentation of Afghanistan*, USA: Yale University Press, pp.279

¹¹³ Ibid., pp.279

¹¹⁴ Goodhand, Jonathan(2005) 'Frontiers and Wars: the Opium Economy in Afghanistan', *Journal of Agrarian Change*, Vol.5, No.2, p. 198 & Rubin, Barnett(2002) *the Fragmentation of Afghanistan*, USA: Yale University Press, p.265

¹¹⁵ Coll, Steve (2004) *Ghost Wars: the Secret History of the CIA, Afghansitan and Bin Laden*, NY: Penguin, p.15

¹¹⁶ Rubin, Barnett(2002) *the Fragmentation of Afghanistan*, USA: Yale University Press, pp.265-266

¹¹⁷ Rich, Paul (2006) 'Globalization and Sub-state Conflict', in Isabelle Duyvesteyn & Jan Angstrom, *Rethinking the Nature of War*, USA: Frank Cass, p. 196

¹¹⁸ Nojumi, Neamatollah (2002) *The Rise of the Taliban in Afghanistan*, NY: Palgrave, p.114

¹¹⁹ Maley, William (2002), *The Afghanistan Wars*, N.Y: Palgrave, p.208

¹²⁰ Barfield, Thomas (2005), Afghanistan is Not the Balkans: Ethnicity and its Political Consequences from a Central Asian: Perspective, *Central Eurasian Studies*, Vol.4, No.1, pp.5-6 & Maley, William (2002), *The Afghanistan Wars*, N.Y: Palgrave, p.208

regionalization.¹²¹ For example, after the Soviet withdrawal, Iran started empowering Shi'ite militants against the Saudi-backed Sunni factions.¹²² The elite disunity, particularly between Pashtun Hekmatyar and Tajik Massoud was another factor for factionalism.¹²³

The State was also weakened by economic factors. Major economic factors responsible for this weakness were regionalization of trade, lose of state's control over taxation, high inflation rate and depreciation, large budget deficit, and state failure in provisions of public services.¹²⁴ Since only one ethnic group dominated the state in this period, it lacked ethnic legitimacy. In contrast, since these ruling parties rose from among the former Islamic rebels, the state was religiously legitimate in the eyes of the people.

1.3.3- State during the Neo-Taliban Insurgency:

Although the post-Taliban state is backed by the United States and the international community, it is weak and has lost Islamic and popular legitimacy in the eyes of rural population. The relatively informal autonomy of the regional administrations could be responsible for this reason the state power. There have been examples of self-ruling efforts in the sub-national bodies in the Southern Afghanistan.¹²⁵ Jan Mohammad, the Uruzgan Govenner, for instance, frequently appointed, by his personal authority, district governors and police chiefs in the Uruzgan province. Similarly, District Governor Abdul Rahman Khan of the Kijran District collected unauthorized taxes from the local populations.¹²⁶ Furthermore the power of the state is undermined by the provincial PRTs¹²⁷ that are managed by country teams of the NATO. These PRTs are detached from the central state; for example the British forces

¹²¹Rubin, Barnett(2002) *the Fragmentation of Afghanistan*, USA: Yale University Press, pp.250-252, 258

¹²²Ibid., pp.264

¹²³ Maley, William (2002), *The Afghanistan Wars*, N.Y: Palgrave, pp. 199-201

¹²⁴ Marsden, Peter, Samman, Emma (2001). 'Afghanistan: The Economic and Social Impact of Conflict', in Frances Stewart & Valpy Fitz Gerald, eds, *War and Underdevelopment – Volume 2: Country Experiences*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp.39-44

¹²⁵Giustozzi, Antonio (2007), *Koran, Kalashnikov, and Laptop: the Neo-Taliban Insurgency in Afghanistan*, UK: Hurst Publishers, pp.57-59

¹²⁶Ibid., pp.110-113

¹²⁷ PRT: PRTs in Afghanistan are key instruments through which the international community delivers assistance at the provincial and district level. Source: USAID Afghanistan URL: <http://afghanistan.usaid.gov/en/Page.PRT.aspx>

in Helmand reached an informal truce with the rebels and local elders without involving the central government, through which the district governor, Chief of Police, and police officers were appointed after consultation with the local elders.¹²⁸

The state administrations are also getting replaced with the local establishment by the rebels. For example, Taliban have established courts in their strongholds to denounce the illegitimacy and weakness of the central government. The map (Figure-4) shows those areas in which the Taliban run their own judiciary.¹²⁹ They collect taxes through road check points to pay their court officials and judges.¹³⁰ They have organized local healthcare systems by paying the kidnapped doctors and nurses.¹³¹ This *Shadow government* is an alternative to the district judicial organizations that are either corrupted or incapable of efficient services.

The neo-Taliban insurgency resembles a conflict between cosmopolitanism and traditionalism. While the foreign forces fight the traditional fanaticism and terrorism, the Taliban struggle to revive a fundamentalist Islamic state. The neo-Taliban insurgency is a clash of traditionalists and particularists with the cosmopolitanism or modernism that has declined the state power and its legitimacy. In other words, a war is waged in which the state power is eroded by fragmentation to subnational and integration to supranational actors. The Afghan state is used as a buffer-zone between the two suprastate and non-state parties.



Map 4: Shows the areas in 2006 (with grey color) where the Taliban had established local courts and ran their own judicial system¹³²

¹²⁸ Antonio Giustozzi (2007), *Koran, Kalashnikov, and Laptop: the Neo-Taliban Insurgency in Afghanistan*, UK: Hurst Publishers, p.211

¹²⁹ Giustozzi, Antonio (2007), *Koran, Kalashnikov, and Laptop: the Neo-Taliban Insurgency in Afghanistan*, UK: Hurst Publishers, pp. 110-113

¹³⁰ *Ibid.*, pp. 110-113

¹³¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 110-113

¹³² *Ibid.*, p.112

To summarize this section, the state had been weak as well as illegitimate in the eyes of, at least a number of the population, in all of the three conflicts in the last three decades in Afghanistan. However, the level of the state power and its legitimacy was different in the three wars. For most of the Afghan population, the Communist regime lacked Islamic legitimacy due to the Soviet domination. In contrast, the domination of the state by a single ethnicity in the civil war as well as the ethnic and religious fragmentation, ethnically illegitimated the state. The current regime, despite its international support, lacks popular legitimacy in the eyes of some rural and fanatic population who support the insurgency. Furthermore, the transnational forces such as the NATO and the ISAF¹³³ have undermined the monopoly of the state on organized violence which further deteriorates the state power.

Conclusion:

To conclude this chapter, the past three decades of war in Afghanistan, show changes in certain features of the politics of war but not in a mainstream and linear pattern (table-5). The ethnic and religious particularism can be traced as side-effects of the anti-Soviet and neo-Taliban wars, while the 1990s civil war was an amalgam of direct ethnic and religious particularistic clashes between the ethnic groups as well as between the Sunni and Shi'ite religious factions. Similarly, the religious particularism and conflicts between the Shi'ite and Sunni factions was not noticeable during the Soviet invasion, and almost absent in the neo-Taliban period, while it considerably aggravated during the civil war.

Although, the state power was to some extent eroded in the anti-Soviet and neo-Taliban insurgency, it was significantly undermined during the civil war. Therefore, it can be argued that the 1990s civil war showed most of the features pertaining to the politics of new wars. The Anti-Soviet war and the current insurgency, on the other hand, have had these features to some extent (see table: 5).

¹³³ ISAF: International Security Alliance Force

The Periods of the three wars	Religious illegitimacy Of the ruling state	Ethnic illegitimacy of the ruling state	Erosion of the State Power	Ethnic Conflicts	Religiously factional Conflicts (Sunni & Shi'ite)	Political ideology of war
1980s Anti-Soviet	Significant	None	To some extent	Few	Very few	Establishment of the Islamic State
1990s Civil War	None	Significant	Significant	Significant	Significant	None
2000s Neo-Taliban	Significant	To some extent	To some extent	Few	none	Reinstatement of the fundamentalist Islamic state

Table-5: Shows the features of the politics of "new war" in the three decades of war in Afghanistan.

Chapter II

Political Economy of War in the Afghan Conflicts

In contrast to the conventional Clausewitzian war economy, which was centralized, formal and constructive for the interests of states, the 'new war' economy is ambiguous, decentralized, informal, network-based and complicated.¹³⁴ The old war parties financed their war from clearly identified sources such as taxation, borrowing and trade.¹³⁵ The 'new war', in contrast, provides an environment for decentralized, criminal, and transnational war economy. The warring parties' sources of finance are either internal looting or external aid.¹³⁶ New wars interrupt the accumulation and arrangement of Social, organizational and human capital that inflicts longer term negative impacts on the national economies.¹³⁷ Steward and FitzGerald assert that these wars are a result of conflict of groups over resources and state power and that the ruling state, during these wars, is too resource-lean to monopolize violence and regularize central economy.¹³⁸ Munkler says as follows regarding the role of non-state actors in the new wars:

"they some times receive financial backing from wealthy private individuals, states and émigré communities; they may sell drilling..., engage in drugs or human trafficking, or extort protection or ransom money; and without exception, they profit from aid...The change in modes of funding is a crucial reason why the new wars may stretch over decades"¹³⁹

There are three different categories of economic actors involved in the economy of the 'new wars'; the combatants, the opportunists, and the ordinary people. According to Goodhand the economy of war has three dimensions; 1), the *combat economy*; that is as Goodhand writes "production, mobilization and allocation of economic resources to sustain war-making"; 2); *shadow economy* which refers to non-combatants who take advantage of the conflict and obtain benefit through illicit means, and, 3) is the

¹³⁴Kaldor, Mary (2006) *New and Old War*, UK: Polity Press, pp.95-97

¹³⁵*Ibid.*, pp.95-97

¹³⁶*Ibid.*, pp.95-118

¹³⁷Steward, Frances, FitzGerald, Valpy (2001) *War and Under Development*, NY: Oxford University Press, pp.14-16

¹³⁸*Ibid.*, p.4

¹³⁹Munkler, Herfried (2005) *The New Wars*, UK: Polity Press, p.1

coping economy for ordinary people who develop a subsistence livelihood to cope with the situation of war.¹⁴⁰ During 'new wars' all three types of the economies are used by combatants, non-combatant war-time entrepreneurs and ordinary people. Most militant groups usually deal with black market, drug business, unauthorized extraction of mines, looting and kidnapping in order to finance their war projects.¹⁴¹ The black market interconnects the flow of resources among belligerent parties including the state with non-state.¹⁴² While the old wars increased state production and accumulation of national capital for meeting the military expenditures, the 'new wars' undermine central economy and it provides the ground for the profits of the non-state *shadow* entrepreneurs. The war becomes a source of livelihood for certain groups who seek its continuation.

The flow of resources, in the 'new wars', takes place in a complicated network of actors. These actors can be ordinary people, rebellions, criminal groups, foreign governments, intelligence agencies, foreign forces, diaspora and paramilitary groups.¹⁴³ The 'new wars' provide a ground for informal economical processes that undermine and incapacitate the state's formal economy. The external aid, transnational remittances, drug business, sale of natural resources and illegal taxation and trade are part of this new political economy of war. In this chapter, I will discuss the political economy of new war in the three wars of Afghanistan and will evaluate the development of the illicit economy and the characteristics of the network of resource-flow across the three decades of war.

2.1- The Illicit Economy of War

2.1.1- Illicit Economy during the Anti-Soviet War (1980s):

The Afghan state economy depended upon Soviet Union during the 1980s war. In 1933, the main economical source of the Afghan state was land taxation. Gradually the land and livestock taxation gave its place to foreign aid to an extent that by 1963

¹⁴⁰Goodhand, Jonathan(2005) 'Frontiers and Wars: the Opium Economy in Afghanistan', *Journal of Agrarian Change*, Vol.5, No.2, pp.199-208

¹⁴¹Kaldor, Mary (2006) *New and Old War*, UK: Polity Press, pp.95-118

¹⁴²Kaldor, Mary (1999), 'The Structure of Conflict' In L. Wohlegemuth, S. Gibson, S. Klasen and E. Rothschild. Uppsala, *Common Security and Civil Society in Africa*, Nordiska Afrikainstitutet, p.127

¹⁴³Kaldor, Mary (2006) *New and Old War*, UK: Polity Press, p. 111

the foreign aid made almost 50 per cent of the annual budget.¹⁴⁴ The main source of financing the counterinsurgency was direct Soviet military and financial aid, and the revenues from the export of natural gas to the Soviet's Central Asian states.¹⁴⁵ Due to the war, the Regime lost track of land and trade taxation and management of rural resources.¹⁴⁶ Overall decline of macroeconomics in this period was decrease in exports, investments, GDP and state revenues while an increase in budget deficit, and inflation rate.¹⁴⁷ Furthermore, prices considerably increased as the currency depreciated by 3000 per cent.¹⁴⁸ The foreign debt increased from US\$ 1.5 billion at the outset of invasion to US\$ 9.6 billion in 1993.¹⁴⁹

The Mujaheddin guerrillas received funds through the ISI-CIA network fueled by the US, Saudi Arabia, UK and China. The US aid was particularly significant as it started from US\$ 30 million in 1980s and reached to as high as US\$1 billion at the end of 1980s.¹⁵⁰ Saudi Arabia contributed more or less the same amount throughout the war.¹⁵¹ Although poppy cultivation slightly increased after the 1979 coup, the production of drugs was not considerably used before the Soviet retreat in 1989 (compare chart 7& 8).¹⁵² That is because substantial financial and military foreign aid during the 1980s kept poppy production in a low level. Due to significant foreign aid, insurgents rarely sought illicit means for financing their war. The poppy products and drug-related benefits were rarely used for financing the war.

2.1.2- Illicit Economy during the 1990s Civil War:

The wartime economy in Afghanistan faced significant changes, on both sides, after the withdrawal of the Soviet forces in 1989 and the collapse of the Kabul regime in 1992. The flow of external aid and arms stopped on both the Kabul regime and the

¹⁴⁴ Rubin, Barnett (1995), *The Fragmentation of Afghanistan: State Formation and Collapse in the International System*, New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, pp.60, 296

¹⁴⁵ Rubin, Barnett (2000), 'The Political Economy of War and Peace in Afghanistan', *World Development*, Vol. 28, No.10, p. 1792

¹⁴⁶ Ibid., p. 1792

¹⁴⁷ Marsden, Peter, Samman, Emma (2001). 'Afghanistan: The Economic and Social Impact of Conflict', in Frances Stewart & Valpy Gerald, eds, *War and Underdevelopment – Volume 2: Country Experiences*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, p.34

¹⁴⁸ Ibid., pp.39-40

¹⁴⁹ Ibid., p.41

¹⁵⁰ Rubin, Barnett(2002) *the Fragmentation of Afghanistan*, USA: Yale University Press, pp.179-183

¹⁵¹ Ibid., pp.179-183

¹⁵² Todd, C., Safi,N., Strathdee, S., (2005), 'Drug Use and Harm Reduction in Afghanistan', *Harm Reduction Journal*, 2005, 2:13,

insurgent groups, after the collapse of the Soviet Union.¹⁵³ The Soviet Union also stopped purchasing the natural gas from Afghanistan and the domestic production decreased by one third.¹⁵⁴ In order to compensate this budget-deficit, the government increased money supply which in turn raised inflation rate.¹⁵⁵ Overall macroeconomic indicators show, 37 to 400 per cent increase in food prices, extremely high inflation, and currency depreciation as high as 45,000: US\$ 1.¹⁵⁶

After the withdrawal, the illicit means of financing war particularly opium production increased in the Southern Afghanistan. There was a shift from formal economy to informal and illicit economy of drug trade, smuggling, and direct use of foreign currency in transactions.¹⁵⁷ The guerrillas and local commanders embarked on illicit and criminal sources for financing their wars as the foreign military and financial aid faded out. The opium business expanded and a network of drug smugglers, refineries and producers established the new complex of combat and shadow economy.¹⁵⁸ In the period of 1992-1996, the annual opium production raised to as high as 2200-2400 metric tones annually.¹⁵⁹ According to Zareen Naqvi, the drugs and gemstone revenues were directly used by the Taliban and the Northern Alliance in procuring arms.¹⁶⁰

Another illicit source for financing the war was the illicit gem trade. Massoud one of the warlords in the Panjsher valley in the north of Kabul financed his operations

¹⁵³ Rubin, Barnett (2000), 'The Political Economy of War and Peace in Afghanistan', *World Development*, Vol. 28, No.10, p. 1791 & Rubin, Barnett(2002) *the Fragmentation of Afghanistan*, USA: Yale University Press, p.257 & Steve Coll (2004) *Ghost Wars: the Secret History of the CIA, Afghansitan and Bin Laden*, NY: Penguin, p.4

¹⁵⁴ Peter Marsden, Emma Samman (2001). 'Afghanistan: The Economic and Social Impact of Conflict', in Frances Stewart & Valpy Gerald, eds, *War and Underdevelopment – Volume 2: Country Experiences*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, p.34

¹⁵⁵ Rubin, Barnett (2000), 'The Political Economy of War and Peace in Afghanistan', *World Development*, Vol. 28, No.10, p. 1791

¹⁵⁶ Peter Marsden, Emma Samman (2001). 'Afghanistan: The Economic and Social Impact of Conflict', in Frances Stewart & Valpy Gerald, eds, *War and Underdevelopment – Volume 2: Country Experiences*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, p.40

¹⁵⁷ *Ibid.*, pp.35

¹⁵⁸ Rubin, Barnett(2002) *the Fragmentation of Afghanistan*, USA: Yale University Press, p.263

¹⁵⁹ Rashed, Ahmad (2001), *Taliban: the Story of Afghan Warlords*, London: McMillan Press, p.119

¹⁶⁰ Naqvi, Zareen (1999) *Afghanistan, Pakistan Trade Relations*. Islamabad: World Bank. Cited in Rubin, Barnett (2000), 'The Political Economy of War and Peace in Afghanistan', *World Development*, Vol. 28, No.10, p. 1795

through illicit trade of lapis lazuli and gemstone.¹⁶¹ During the late 1980s, Massoud embarked on extracting and smuggling emerald and Lazuli mines to the black market in Pakistan.¹⁶² Ustina Markus wrote about the smuggling process of gem in the North of Afghanistan: "donkeys would cross from the Panjshir into Pakistan with saddlebags full of lapis. The donkeys would then return to the Panjshir with saddlebags full of guns and ammunition."¹⁶³ The warlords collected *ushr*¹⁶⁴ (harvest tax) from the poppy cultivators and indirect taxes from the opium and gemstone traders.¹⁶⁵ Chipaux estimates that the northern commanders earned around \$200 million annually from the gem business.¹⁶⁶

Shadow entrepreneurs or the wartime opportunists were also active besides the combat entrepreneurs in this period of war. In other words, both combatants, such as the former insurgent groups and the Taliban, and the non-combatants, such as landlords, drug producers, and smugglers, were involved and inter-connected in the illicit economy of war. The Taliban began to develop drug cultivation and trade after they dominated the South. Taliban forces actively promoted poppy cultivation in the provinces under their control.¹⁶⁷ They levied 10-20 per cent harvest tax on peasants, and 2.5 per cent religious tax or *zakat*¹⁶⁸ on the revenues of the drug dealers and wealthy landlords.¹⁶⁹ The exports of opium products from Afghanistan to Pakistan increased from US\$1.5 billion in 1995 to US\$3 billion in 1995.¹⁷⁰ Many opium processing industries were established in the Taliban dominated territories.¹⁷¹ A

¹⁶¹ Ahmad Shah Massoud, Telegraph, Published on Published: 12:00AM BST 17 Sep 2001-
<http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/obituaries/1340726/Ahmad-Shah-Massoud.html>

¹⁶² Markus, Ustina (2007) 'Minerals key to Afghan development', *International Relations and Security Network*,
URL: <http://www.isn.ethz.ch/isn/Current-Affairs/Security-Watch/Detail/?ots591=4888CAA0-B3DB-1461-98B9-E20E7B9C13D4&lng=en&id=53618>

¹⁶³ Ibid.,

¹⁶⁴ Ushr: (harvest tax) Ushr is the obligatory charge (*Zakat*) on farm produce which is one-tenth for one kind of land and one-twentieth for others. Source: <http://muslim-canada.org/fiqhch4.html>

¹⁶⁵ Rubin, Barnett (2000), 'The Political Economy of War and Peace in Afghanistan', *World Development*, Vol. 28, No.10, p. 1791

¹⁶⁶ Chipaux, F. (1999). Des mines d' _emeraude pour @nancerla r _esistance du commandant Massoud. *Le Monde*, Paris, July 17 cited in Rubin, Barnett (2000), 'The Political Economy of War and Peace in Afghanistan', *World Development*, Vol. 28, No.10, p. 1797

¹⁶⁷ Rashid, Ahmad (2001), *Taliban: the Story of Afghan Warlords*, London: McMillan Press, pp. 117-123

¹⁶⁸ According to Islamic Sharia each person who has extra wealth should voluntarily give out his 2.5% of the riches annually

¹⁶⁹ Ahmed Rashid (2008) *Descent into Chaos*, NY: Penguin Groups, pp. 319-321 & Rashid, Ahmad (2001), *Taliban: the Story of Afghan Warlords*, London: McMillan Press, p.118-119

¹⁷⁰ Rashid, Ahmad (2001), *Taliban: the Story of Afghan Warlords*, London: McMillan Press, p.118-119

¹⁷¹ Ibid., p.120

number of the Taliban commanders were directly engaged in drug dealing and or benefited from the business through an intermediary.¹⁷² Drug convoys were smuggled by land to Iran, Turkey, Turkmenistan and Baluchistan.¹⁷³ Kargo planes were also used for trafficking drugs from Kandahar to the UAE ports.¹⁷⁴

2.1.3- Illicit Economy in the Neo-Taliban Insurgency:

There are almost no illicit sources used by the current counterinsurgency operations by the government of Afghanistan and the international forces. Almost all costs of the Afghan National Army and the National Police are provided by the external sources, mainly the United States.¹⁷⁵ Since 2002, USA has contributed US\$ 32 billion for the development and operations of the Afghan military and police forces.¹⁷⁶ In contrast, the illicit economical sources such as opium economy have a key role in the current insurgency. Afghanistan is currently the world's top producer of opium.¹⁷⁷ According to the World Drug Report 2008, Afghanistan produced 92 per cent of the opium in the world in 2007.¹⁷⁸ The UNODC report confirmed that the opium business and poppy cultivation in the Southern Afghanistan is no longer a means for subsistence livelihood of peasants but it directly fuels the military operations of the Taliban insurgency.¹⁷⁹ The regional factor of the poppy cultivation also confirms its relation with the insurgency. That is to say, the poppy cultivation is considerably high in the provinces where the insurgents dominate.¹⁸⁰ The Helmand province, which is the main center of Taliban rebels, produced around 50 per cent of the poppy of Afghanistan in 2007.¹⁸¹ There are also shadow actors who seek economic benefits by abusing the situation of conflict. For example, corrupt government officials in the southern and eastern provinces have made profits for controlling smuggling routes.¹⁸²

¹⁷²Rashid, Ahmad (2001), *Taliban: the Story of Afghan Warlords*, London: McMillan Press, p.118-119

¹⁷³Ibid., p.120

¹⁷⁴Ibid., p.120

¹⁷⁵Katzman, Kenneth (May 22, 2009) Afghanistan: Post-Taliban Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy, Congressional Research Service, p. 53-75, source: www.crs.gov

¹⁷⁶Ibid., p. 53

¹⁷⁷World Drug Report 2008, United Nations Office on Drug and Crime, URL: http://www.unodc.org/documents/wdr/WDR_2008/WDR_2008_eng_web.pdf

¹⁷⁸Ibid.

¹⁷⁹Afghanistan Opium Survey 2007, UNODC, URL

http://www.unodc.org/pdf/research/AFG07_ExSum_web.pdf

¹⁸⁰Ibid.,

¹⁸¹Ibid.,

¹⁸²Johnson, C., Maley, W., A. Their & Wardak, A. (2003) *Afghanistan's Political and Constitutional Development. HPG Report 3*. London: ODI

A comparative analysis of the illicit economy of wars shows that the country underwent the wartime illicit economy such as opium cultivation and trade in all of the three wars. The war against Soviets was a primary factor that facilitated the raise in the poppy cultivation in Afghanistan. Maley asserts that the destruction of irrigation system encouraged poor Afghan peasants to get valuable crop such as opium poppy from small portion of their lands.¹⁸³ Nevertheless, the drug business was not a key source of combat economy during the Soviet invasion. The illicit drug economy and gemstone trade and its relation with war peaked during the 1990s civil war as warring groups benefited from it. The decline in the foreign cash-aid to the Mujaheddin parties developed the poppy culture as a key replacement for fueling the war and supplying the civil war parties.¹⁸⁴ The neo-Taliban's primary source of funding is collection of drug taxation from the landlords and peasants in the Southern provinces. The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime in Afghanistan published a chart (chart: 7) in which it shows the dramatic raise in the opium economy during the civil war.¹⁸⁵ This increase in drug production took place after a sudden decline in the foreign aid to the insurgents (see chart 7 & 8). Although illicit means were used in all three wars of Afghanistan, drug production peaked during the civil war.

Further comparative study of the economic sources of state and non-state parties in the three wars, suggests that the state has always been weak, resource-less and dependent. However, during the Soviet invasion and the neo-Taliban insurgency, the foreign aid could satisfy the primary economic resource requirements for the survival of the state and therefore the states did not pursue illicit means. While, during the civil war both state and non-state parties pursued illegal means for financing war. It suggests that in terms of war economy and involvement of state in illicit economy, the civil war shows the characteristics of the 'new wars'. However, the illicit resources were only to some extent used in the anti-Soviet and neo-Taliban conflicts.

¹⁸³Maley, William (2002), *The Afghanistan Wars*, N.Y: Palgrave, p.156

¹⁸⁴Rubin, Barnett(2002) *the Fragmentation of Afghanistan*, USA: Yale University Press, p.257

¹⁸⁵Goodhand, Jonathan(2005) 'Frontiers and Wars: the Opium Economy in Afghanistan', *Journal of Agrarian Change*, Vol.5, No.2, p. 203




Chart 7: Shows the decline of the foreign aid (US\$ million) to the non-state warring parties after the collapse of the Communist Regime. The next chart (chart 8) shows an increase in the poppy cultivation just after the aid is stopped.¹⁸⁶




Chart 8: Shows the increase in the opium production after the collapse of the Communist Regime and end of the foreign aid to the rebels.¹⁸⁷

2.2- Complicated Resource-flow networks:

2.2.1- Resource-flow during the Soviet Invasion:

The theory of the "new war" explains the informalization of war economy in which various actors exchange resources in formal and informal ways.¹⁸⁸ The complicated resource-flow network connects state, non-state and transnational actors.¹⁸⁹ As mentioned before, almost all of the costs of war the DRA were financed by the Soviet

¹⁸⁶Rubin, Barnett(2002) *the Fragmentation of Afghanistan*, USA: Yale University Press, p.179 184-

¹⁸⁷ Taylor, Steven (2005), 'When Wars Collide: The War on Drugs and the Global War on Terror', Center for Contemporary Conflict, *Strategic Insights*, Vol. IV, Issue 6 (June 2005)

¹⁸⁸Kaldor, Mary (2006) *New and Old War*, UK: Polity Press, p. 109-112

¹⁸⁹Ibid., p. 109-112

military and financial aid.¹⁹⁰ The remaining gap in the military budget was filled by borrowings and export of natural gas (Chart-8).¹⁹¹ Therefore, the resources flowed between the closed network of the government and the Soviet Union.

The resource-flow network on the rebels' side was multi-dimensional as it was established between the local commanders, the humanitarian aid agencies, Pakistan-based political parties, drug cultivators & traders, peasants, wealthy landlords, and the foreign countries (Diagram-9).¹⁹² The first source of funding was foreign aid from countries such as Saudi Arabia, USA, Libya and Britain. These sources were channeled to the local militant groups through humanitarian agencies such as SCA, Red Cross, or their party offices in Pakistan.¹⁹³ Pakistan intelligence agency (ISI), with the support of the US, played significant intermediate role in providing finances, logistics and arms to the groups.¹⁹⁴ Secondly, the guerrilla commanders also received grants from wealthy individuals, voluntary agrarian tax (ushr), and religious charity (zakat), tax from traders, local landlords and peasants.¹⁹⁵ The third and least significant source was from the illicit resources such as poppy cultivation, drug trade, on-road tolls on the traffickers and direct taxes.¹⁹⁶ The direct involvement of the rebel commanders in the poppy cultivation was only reported in Badakhshan province.¹⁹⁷ Few cases of looting food and logistic convoys were also noted in this period.¹⁹⁸ The resource-flow networks of the state and the insurgents were clearly separated from each other (see diagram-9). The resource-flow was multi-actor but close-ended and clearly defined.

¹⁹⁰Babur, Imtanan (2008) *Lessons of History: Comparison of the Soviet Intervention to the ISAF mission in Afghanistan*, MDS Research Project, Canadian Force College, p.37

¹⁹¹Ibid., p.37

¹⁹² Dorronsoro, Gilles (2005) *Revolution Unending: Afghanistan: 1979 to the Present*, UK: C. Hurst & Co. Publishers, pp.129-136 & Rubin, Barnett(2002) *the Fragmentation of Afghanistan*, USA: Yale University Press, p.180

¹⁹³ Rubin, Barnett(2002) *the Fragmentation of Afghanistan*, USA: Yale University Press, pp.179-183, 257 & Maley, William (2002), *The Afghanistan Wars*, N.Y: Palgrave, pp.83-84 & Dorronsoro, Gilles (2005) *Revolution Unending: Afghanistan: 1979 to the Present*, UK: C. Hurst & Co. Publishers, pp.129-136 & Dorronsoro, Gilles (2005) *Revolution Unending: Afghanistan: 1979 to the Present*, UK: C. Hurst & Co. Publishers, pp.129-136

¹⁹⁴Maley, William (2002), *The Afghanistan Wars*, N.Y: Palgrave, p.75 & Rubin, Barnett(2002) *the Fragmentation of Afghanistan*, USA: Yale University Press, pp.188-189

¹⁹⁵ Rubin, Barnett(2002) *the Fragmentation of Afghanistan*, USA: Yale University Press, pp.187-191

¹⁹⁶Dorronsoro, Gilles (2005) *Revolution Unending: Afghanistan: 1979 to the Present*, UK: C. Hurst & Co. Publishers, pp.129-136

¹⁹⁷Ibid., pp.129-136

¹⁹⁸Rubin, Barnett(2002) *the Fragmentation of Afghanistan*, USA: Yale University Press, p.190,236




Diagram 9; shows the resource-flow network during the Soviet invasion. It can be noted that the ruling government and the rebels' flow of resources are separate.¹⁹⁹

2.2.2- Resource Flow during the Civil War:

This new pattern of resource-flow of the war economy was a typical phenomenon of the "new wars". The resource-network was complicated, multidimensional and expanded beyond state borders. In terms of resource-network, a number of new, state, para-state and transnational actors engaged into the war economy. As we see in the (Diagram-10), the resource network, in this period, was interconnected, open-ended and multi-directional. The prominent economical actors in this new pattern were multiple and diverse such as the state, former guerrilla groups, the transnational networks such as the Al-Qaeda, and even large oil corporations such as UNOCAL and Bidas, the intelligence organizations such as ISI and CIA, transnational criminal organizations, the poppy landlords, the gem traders, the drug traffickers and the

¹⁹⁹Rubin, Barnett(2002) *the Fragmentation of Afghanistan*, USA: Yale University Press, pp.179-190, 196-197 & Rubin, Barnett (2000), 'The Political Economy of War and Peace in Afghanistan', *World Development*, Vol. 28, No.10, & Dorronsoro, Gilles (2005) *Revolution Unending: Afghanistan: 1979 to the Present*, UK: C. Hurst & Co. Publishers & Maley, William (2002), *The Afghanistan Wars*, N.Y: Palgrave & Rubin, Barnett (2002) *the Fragmentation of Afghanistan*, USA: Yale University Press

ordinary people.²⁰⁰ The resources flowed from the drug cultivators, drug traffickers, and gem traders to the warlords. According to Steve Coll the Taliban, in this period, received funds from unknown sources.²⁰¹ Northern Alliance²⁰² funded their war through extraction and trade of gemstone and illegal print of currency.²⁰³

The economy of war was extended beyond the borders and connected with foreign states, non-state and business actors. The neighboring states and a number of multinational corporations sought long-term benefits in the continuation of war. For example, Pakistan and Iran competed over the oil pipeline from the Central Asian countries to their relevant seaports.²⁰⁴ Taliban also received indirect funds from a number of multinational corporations (MNCs) through the Pakistan Intelligence Agency which added to the complexity of the resource-flow.²⁰⁵ The oil corporations were competing on the contract of the pipeline from the Central Asia to the Indian subcontinent seaports through Afghanistan.²⁰⁶ Neighboring countries such as Iran provided arms and money to the Shi'ite parties in the central Afghanistan.²⁰⁷ Furthermore, the transnational networks such as Al-Qaeda provided financial support to the Taliban and later to their state.²⁰⁸

Connection of resource-flow with the transnational criminal networks was another feature of this war. The northern groups were connected with the Russian Mafia through drug and gem-trafficking to the Central Asia and Moscow.²⁰⁹ In return, the Mafia supplied weapons to the Northern militant groups after they were thrown out of power in Kabul.²¹⁰ According to some Taliban officials, a large part of the military

²⁰⁰Rubin, Barnett (2000), 'The Political Economy of War and Peace in Afghanistan', *World Development*, Vol. 28, No.10, p. 1794

²⁰¹ Coll, Steve (2004) *Ghost Wars: the Secret History of the CIA, Afghansitan and Bin Laden*, NY: Penguin, p.14

²⁰² Northern Alliance were the coalition of groups formed to resist Taliban advance

²⁰³Rubin, Barnett (2000), 'The Political Economy of War and Peace in Afghanistan', *World Development*, Vol. 28, No.10, p. 1797 & Rashid, Ahmad (2001), *Taliban: the Story of Afghan Warlords*, London: McMillan Press, p.72

²⁰⁴Nojumi, Neamatollah (2002) *The Rise of the Taliban in Afghanistan*, NY: Palgrave, pp.182-188

²⁰⁵Rashid, Ahmad (2001), *Taliban: the Story of Afghan Warlords*, London: McMillan Press, p.157-182

²⁰⁶*Ibid.*, p.157-182

²⁰⁷*Ibid.*, p.72

²⁰⁸*Ibid.*, p.157-182

²⁰⁹Rashid, Ahmad (2001), *Taliban: the Story of Afghan Warlords*, London: McMillan Press, p.72 & Rubin, Barnett (2000), 'The Political Economy of War and Peace in Afghanistan', *World Development*, Vol. 28, No.10, p. 179 & Maley, William (2002), *The Afghanistan Wars*, N.Y: Palgrave, p.225

²¹⁰Rubin, Barnett (2000), 'The Political Economy of War and Peace in Afghanistan', *World Development*, Vol. 28, No.10, p. 1794

expenses were met through other open-end and secret sources from outside the country.²¹¹ The urban population received microfinance and subsidized food supply from humanitarian agencies. There was a concern that this aid to population would have given an excuse to the Taliban regime to meet the needs of the population who were suffering from poverty.²¹²




Diagram 10; shows the complex resource-flow chart during the civil war of 1990s²¹³

2.2.3- Resource-Flow in the neo-Taliban War:

Although, the resource-flow network is less complicated than the civil war, transnational and non-state actors are still engaged in the war economy. This is simplified in the figure-11. The resource-flow network is composed of the state, some

²¹¹ Rashid, Ahmad (2001), *Taliban: the Story of Afghan Warlords*, London: McMillan Press, p.124

²¹² Ibid., p.72 & Rubin, Barnett (2000), 'The Political Economy of War and Peace in Afghanistan', *World Development*, Vol. 28, No.10, p. 179

²¹³ Rashid, Ahmad (2001), *Taliban: the Story of Afghan Warlords*, London: McMillan Press & Angelo Rasanaygam (2009) *Afghanistan: A Modern History*, NY: I.B. Touris & Co.Ltd, & Rubin, Barnett (2000), 'The Political Economy of War and Peace in Afghanistan', *World Development*, Vol. 28, No.10

foreign governments, and the international organizations, the NATO, the US forces, the Taliban Commanders, and ordinary people.

The transnational feature of the resource-flow is prominent in the Neo-Taliban insurgency. The international donors fund the central administration through direct contributions and through NGOs.²¹⁴ Resources also flow from NATO member countries to all provincial military units through the Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRT).²¹⁵ Foreign state intelligence agencies such as the ISI are allegedly funding the Hezb-i-Islami branch of the current insurgency.²¹⁶

The Taliban branch of the insurgency spend around US\$20-45 million per year to fund their insurgency for which they have two main sources; wealthy sympathizers as Giustozzi writes; "in 2002 Mullah Omar²¹⁷ started raising funds for the new jihad within his network of contacts in Pakistan and the Gulf, composed of 'Karachi businessmen, Peshawar goldsmiths, Saudi oil men, Kuwaiti traders and Jihadi sympathizers within the Pakistani military and intelligence ranks...Afghan traders." and 2) the illicit means such as drug business and kidnappings. The drug production and cultivation has dramatically increased in places occupied by neo-Taliban.²¹⁸ For example, there was 250 per cent expansion of the poppy farms in 2006 in the Taliban-dominated province, Helmand.²¹⁹ Giustozzi argues that in spite of the Taliban's support of drugs and trafficking, it remains as secondary source for their insurgency and that they are not involved directly in the drug trafficking.²²⁰ This argument is questionable as if Taliban forces profited from the drug business during 1990s civil war, why would they refrain from doing so now. The flow of resources in the current insurgency is shown in the (Diagram-11). The resource-flow diagram is interconnected between the belligerent parties same as the civil war of 1990s. For

²¹⁴Rasanaygam, Angelo (2009) *Afghanistan: A Modern History*, NY: I.B. Touris & Co.Ltd, pp.273-274

²¹⁵Katzman, Kenneth (May 22, 2009) Afghanistan: Post-Taliban Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy, Congressional Research Service, p. 39-38, source: www.crs.gov

²¹⁶ Goodhand, Jonathan(2005) 'Frontiers and Wars: the Opium Economy in Afghanistan', *Journal of Agrarian Change*, Vol.5, No.2, p. 203

²¹⁷ The leader of the Afghan Taliban

²¹⁸Giustozzi, Antonio (2007), *Koran, Kalashnikov, and Laptop: The Taliban Insurgency in Afghanistan*, UK: Hurst Publishers, p.86-88

²²⁰Ibid., p.88

example, the humanitarian aid to the rural people would also indirectly promote the Taliban insurgency.




Diagram 11: Shows the resource flow in during the neo-Taliban insurgency²²¹

In connection with the resource networks, four distinct changes can be pointed out in the course of the three decade war; Firstly, in spite of the involvement of international actors in funding the insurgency, the resource-flow during the Soviet invasion has a closed pattern as the resource-ends are clearly defined. This pattern changed during the 1990s civil war as some un-known transnational sources and diaspora began funding the conflict parties. Similar to the civil war, there are a number of open-end sources financing the neo-Taliban war such as the Al-Qaeda groups and others.

²²¹Giustozzi, Antonio (2007), *Koran, Kalashnikov, and Laptop: The Taliban Insurgency in Afghanistan*, UK: Hurst Publishers, & Rasanaygam, Angelo (2009) *Afghanistan: A Modern History*, NY: I.B. Touris & Co.Ltd, & Kenneth Katzman (May 22, 2009) *Afghanistan: Post-Taliban Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy*, Congressional Research Service,

Secondly, during the Soviet invasion, both sides of the war had separate resource-flow networks. The Soviets were funding the Afghan military units and the resources flow simply from the Soviet Union to the Afghan government.²²² In contrast, during the civil war, the resources were channelled indirectly between the belligerent parties, the Northern Alliance and the Taliban and Southern Pashtun commanders through the drug dealers and the smugglers.²²³ Furthermore, the informal currency printed by the Northern mobile Administration²²⁴ was used by the Taliban government.²²⁵ The neo-Taliban insurgency also shows few resource connections between the insurgents and the state. For example corrupt government officials who were involved in the drug business.²²⁶ Furthermore, the humanitarian agencies provide aid to the rural population that indirectly contributes to the Taliban insurgency.²²⁷

Thirdly, the number of actors in the resource-flow network considerably increased during the 1990s civil. That is to say, the transnational terrorist organizations, the large oil industries, Mafia, and un-known religious diaspora added to the complexity of the pattern.²²⁸ Comparing to the limited number of sources for the neo-Taliban insurgency, the economic actors of this war are numerous.

Finally, In both wars of 1990s and the neo-Taliban insurgency, increase in the opium cultivation, drug trade and gem trade show the involvement of the *shadow entrepreneurs* (noncombatant opportunists) beside the *combat entrepreneurs* (combatant groups) in the illicit deals.²²⁹

²²²Babur, Imtanan (2008) Lessons of History: Comparison of the Soviet Intervention to the ISAF mission in Afghanistan, MDS Research Project, Canadian Force College, p.37 Rubin, Barnett(2002) *the Fragmentation of Afghanistan*, USA: Yale University Press, pp.180-181

²²³Rashid, Ahmad (2001), *Taliban: the Story of Afghan Warlords*, London: McMillan Press, pp.17-67

²²⁴Mobile administration: refers to the informal state administration of the Northern Alliance which was transferred from one province to another as the Taliban advanced in the North

²²⁵Rubin, Barnett (2000), 'The Political Economy of War and Peace in Afghanistan', *World Development*, Vol. 28, No.10, p. 1797 & Rashid, Ahmad (2001), *Taliban: the Story of Afghan Warlords*, London: McMillan Press, p.72

²²⁶Johnson, C., Maley, W., A. Their & Wardak, A. (2003) *Afghanistan's Political and Constitutional Development. HPG Report 3*. London: ODI

²²⁷Jones, Seth (2008), 'The raise of Insurgency in Afghanistan: State Failure and Jihad', *International Security*, Vol. 32, No. 4, Pages 22-25

²²⁸Rashid, Ahmad (2001), *Taliban: the Story of Afghan Warlords*, London: McMillan Press, p.157-182

²²⁹Giustozzi, Antonio (2007), *Koran, Kalashnikov, and Laptop: The Taliban Insurgency in Afghanistan*, UK: Hurst Publishers, p.88 & World Drug Report 2008, United Nations Office on Drug and Crime, URL: http://www.unodc.org/documents/wdr/WDR_2008/WDR_2008_eng_web.pdf & Rashid, Ahmad (2001), *Taliban: the Story of Afghan Warlords*, London: McMillan Press, p.118-119

Conclusion:

To conclude this chapter, the anti-Soviet war was mainly funded by external aid to the both sides; the Communist regime (DRA) and the rebel groups. However, involvement of few insurgent groups in drugs and illegal gem trade can not be denied. After the collapse of the regime, and as the foreign aid stopped, the actors in the civil war embarked on using illicit means for financing the war. The illicit war economy is also increasingly used by the neo-Taliban and their peer groups. Although State was weak and dependent in all the three wars, it was involved in illicit means for financing wars during the 1990s civil war.

The resource-flow changed to a complicated, multi-actor, open-end and interconnected pattern between state and non-state actors after the Soviet withdrawal. Both in the civil war and the neo-Taliban insurgency, there have been open-end and transnational sources from which resources flowed to the warring parties. Resources also have flowed between the state and non-state actors in the civil war and the neo-Taliban insurgency. It can be suggested that the features of the 'new war' economy are very prominent and significant during the Civil War. However, some features of the new war economy can also be, to some extent, noticed in the anti-Soviet insurgency and the current neo-Taliban insurgency (see table-12).

This study suggests that there is a relationship between the foreign aid to the warring parties, use of illicit economical resources. Foreign aid helps to decrease the significance of illicit economy in the war. That is because; firstly, the parties' financial and logistic requirements are fulfilled and secondly, the foreign aid –which is usually channeled through central commandments –strengthens control of the core –such as party leadership– on the smaller units –military units–. In an ideological war, the parties tend to be more focused on their final goal rather than the means for war. For example, the rebels in the Soviet war were devoted to fight the Communists and Soviets and to reinstate an Islamic state rather than the civil war. In contrary, lack of ideology provides a ground for the groups to focus on the means of war rather than the goals. This phenomenon was clearly shown in the civil war of 1990s in Afghanistan, as almost all parties including the state were engaged in the illicit economy and they benefited from the continuation of conflict.

<i>The Periods of the three wars</i>	<i>Transnational Sources</i>	<i>Open-end resource channels</i>	<i>Drug Trade</i>	<i>Gem Trade</i>	<i>Multiplicity of Actors in the Resource-Network</i>	<i>Shadow Entrepreneurs</i>
1980s-Soviet Invasion	To some extent	No	Insignificant	Insignificant	Insignificant	Insignificant
1990s civil war	Significant	Significant	Significant	Significant	Significant	Significant
2000s neo-Taliban	To some extent	To some extent	To some extent	No	Insignificant	To some extent

Table 12: Compares the features of the 'new war' economy in the three decade wars in Afghanistan

Chapter III

The Conduct of 'new warfare' in the Afghan Conflicts

The mode of warfare includes operational and military conduct of the warring groups for achieving military objectives. Old wars, according to Clausewitz, were fought in three distinct levels –at the level of politicians to decide rationally, at the level of army generals to make a strategy and at the level of soldiers to use their emotions in the war–.²³⁰ This traditional pattern of war is different in the 'new wars' as it is difficult to distinguish between the decision makers and the generals and between the combatants and non-combatants.²³¹ Furthermore, the diversity and multiplicity of units in the conflict is another aspect of new wars. There are such groups as mercenaries, paramilitary, militias, and subcontractors, in addition to the conventional armies. Furthermore, the casualties that occur in the 'new wars' are some times deliberately targeted civilians.²³² Massacres, rapes, and ethnic repression are also used as tools to achieve military objectives in the 'new wars'.²³³ Contrary to the traditional 'hearts and minds' strategy, the support of the population is sought through promoting fear and terror.²³⁴ It is difficult to distinguish between organized criminal groups and combatant units. Munkler writes about the mode of new wars "there are not fronts, and, therefore, few actual engagements and no major battles; military forces do not lock horns and wear each other down, but spare each other and direct their violence mostly against civilians."²³⁵ In this chapter, development of changes in the two key characteristics of the mode of warfare, attributed to the 'new wars', will be discussed in the context of the three wars of Afghanistan. In the first section, I will discuss the level of atrocities in the three wars and will examine the extent to which civilian casualties, rapes, massacres, and ethnic cleansing were used in the three wars

²³⁰ Clausewitz, Carl Von (1873) *On War: Translation by Colonel J. Graham*, London: N. Truner, Book.1, <http://www.clausewitz.com>

²³¹ Kaldor, Mary (2005), 'Elaborating the "new war" thesis' in Isabelle Duyvesteyn & Jan Angstrom, *Rethinking the Nature of War*, USA: Frank Cass, pp.1-15

²³² Ibid., p. 215

²³³ Ibid., p. 215

²³⁴ Kaldor, Mary (1999), 'The Structure of Conflict' In L. Wohlegemuth, S. Gibson, S. Klasen and E. Rothschild. Uppsala, *Common Security and Civil Society in Africa*, Nordiska Afrikainstitutet, p.125

²³⁵ Munkler, Herfried (2005) *The New Wars*, UK: Polity Press, p.3

of Afghanistan. In the second section, the diversity of military groups across the three decades will be analyzed.

3.1. Civilian Casualties and Atrocious Acts:

3.1.1- Soviet Invasion:

One of the distinct features of the 'new war' is the high rate of civilian casualties. Kaldor states that the ratio of civilian-military casualties is much higher than the old wars. The Soviets caused civilian casualties through massive airpower and use of chemical weapons.²³⁶ They, for instance, bombarded the Herat city block-by-block in 1982.²³⁷ During the period of 1980-1987, local farmers reported 136 cases of village bombings, 51 cases of shooting livestock, and 21 cases of burning crops by the Soviet forces.²³⁸ However, most of the civilian casualties by the Soviet forces were inflicted by their strategy of 'drive-off population' in order to depopulate the rebellion-dominated areas.²³⁹ The DRA intelligence (*KHAD*) also committed tortures, mass arrests, and thousands of death sentences.²⁴⁰

3.1.2- Atrocity in the Civil War:

During the civil war of the 1990s, a high level of atrocious acts was committed by several groups. These acts were committed not only by the non-state but also by the state-owned forces. Furthermore, incidents such as rapes, ethnic cleansing, burning farms and plunder frequently took place during this war. Around one thousand civilians were, for example, killed during shelling the Kabul city in August 1992.²⁴¹ The Taliban forces also massacred hundreds of Hazara civilians in the northern city of Mazar-e-Sharif and in the Yakawlang district of Bamyan.²⁴² Rashid reported about the massacre of 600 Uzbeks in the North: "civilians were dragged from their homes, lined up and gunned down."²⁴³ The militia forces and the former rebel groups

²³⁶Rubin, Barnett(2002) *the Fragmentation of Afghanistan*, USA: Yale University Press, pp.228,

²³⁷Nojumi, Neamatollah (2002) *The Rise of the Taliban in Afghanistan*, NY: Palgrave, p.98

²³⁸Rubin, Barnett(2002) *the Fragmentation of Afghanistan*, USA: Yale University Press, pp.228,

²³⁹McMichael, Scott (1991), *Stumbling Bear: Soviet Military Performance in Afghanistan*, London: Brassey, p.51

²⁴⁰Rubin, Barnett(2002) *the Fragmentation of Afghanistan*, USA: Yale University Press, p.122

²⁴¹BBC Summary of World Broadcasts FE/1461/B/1, 17 August 1992 cited in Maley, William (2002), *The Afghanistan Wars*, N.Y: Palgrave, p.198

²⁴²Maley, William (2002), *The Afghanistan Wars*, N.Y: Palgrave, p.240

²⁴³Rashid, Ahmad (2001), *Taliban*, Oxford: Pan McMillan Ltd., p. 70

divided Kabul city during 1992-1995 and attacked each others' posts in the midst of the residential areas.²⁴⁴ This caused tens of thousands of civilian casualty.²⁴⁵ The Amnesty International report in 1995 stated as follows about these conflicts:

"Thousands of civilians were killed and thousands more were wounded in artillery attacks deliberately aimed at residential areas by all factions in the civil war. Hundreds of men, women and children were deliberately and arbitrarily killed by members of the main armed groups during raids on civilian homes. Torture, including rape of women and children, was reportedly widespread. People were unlawfully imprisoned in private detention centers because of their political opinions, religion or ethnic origin, or as hostages. Journalists covering the war were detained or imprisoned by the warring factions. Hundreds of people "disappeared"... Hundreds of women, young girls and boys were reportedly subjected to brutal torture and rape by members of the armed factions.... Rival groups took up positions in residential areas on both sides of the River Kabul."²⁴⁶

There are also reports of massacre in this period. In one of the incidents in the west of the Kabul city, Afshar, hundreds of Hazaras, including women and children, were killed by the government soldiers. According to Mousavi it was directly ordered by the President himself.²⁴⁷

Furthermore, destruction and plunder of archeological assets was another new characteristic of this war. The Kabul National Museum was looted by the Hezb-e-Wahdat party in 1993 as 70 per cent of its assets were looted and smuggled to foreign black markets.²⁴⁸ The Taliban committed another version of this act, as they destroyed the two huge and ancient Buddha statues in the central province of Afghanistan, Bamiyan.²⁴⁹ The Taliban militants also committed massacres, ethnic cleansing, beheading of war prisoners and setting fire to residential houses and

²⁴⁴ Rubin, Barnett(2002) *the Fragmentation of Afghanistan*, USA: Yale University Press, pp.271-275

²⁴⁵ BBC Summary of World Broadcasts FE/1644/B/1, 16 April 1993 cited in Maley, William (2002), *The Afghanistan Wars*, N.Y: Palgrave, pp.202-203

²⁴⁶ Amnesty International, *Amnesty International Report 1995 - Afghanistan*, 1 January 1995, available at: <http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/3ae6a9fb18.html>

²⁴⁷ Mousavi, Sayed Akbar (1997), *The Hazaras of Afghanistan: An Historical Cultural, Economic and Political Study*, NY: St. Marine's Press, p.198 cited in Maley, William (2002), *The Afghanistan Wars*, N.Y: Palgrave, p.205

²⁴⁸ Dupree, Nancy Hatch (1996) 'Museum Under Siege', *Archeological Institute of America*, 0003-8113,

²⁴⁹ Babrak, Barry (March 12, 2001) *Afghan Says Destruction of Buddha is Complete*, New York Times, <http://www.nytimes.com/2001/03/12/world/afghan-says-destruction-of-buddhas-is-complete.html?scp=1&sq=destruction%20of%20buddhas%20in%20Afghanistan&st=cse>

agricultural farms during this war.²⁵⁰ The tyranny of war was conducted by all parties of the war and most of the time it was used as tactics for achieving their goals.

3.1.3- Neo-Taliban and Atrocious Acts:

Neo-Taliban forces infiltrate the population sowing fear and hatred. They distribute night-letters and threaten those that work with the government or non-state agencies to abandon their employment or otherwise they will face death.²⁵¹ The 'assassination of collaborators'²⁵² is part of the neo-Taliban strategy. They have assassinated doctors, NGO workers, teachers, employees, and even Mullahs who were likely supporters of the government in order to tame the local populations by inducing terror and fear.²⁵³ They paid bounty amounts –around US\$ 250– for the murder of each collaborator.²⁵⁴ The militants deliberately opposed education and closed as many as 380 schools in the period of 2003-2006, and assassinated 85 school teachers during March 2006-March 2007.²⁵⁵ Taliban also used unique and torturous ways of assassinations to demoralize enemy and influence the ordinary people. There were many cases of mutilation, dismembering and beheadings recorded.²⁵⁶ Moreover, suicide bombing is another way of terrorizing and demoralizing in which most casualties are civilians. As a result of suicide attacks in 2006, 206 Afghan civilians were killed, compared to 54 Afghan army and police soldiers, and 18 foreign troops.²⁵⁷ Giustozzi argues that the neo-Taliban have dual strategy as they try to win 'hearts and minds' of the rural population and therefore try to minimize civilian casualties, while, on the other hand, they are more intrusive, and violent against the urban population who are not potential supporters.²⁵⁸ The atrocious acts were also reported to be performed by the National Police and the National Army. The police

²⁵⁰Nojumi, Neamatollah (2002) *The Rise of the Taliban in Afghanistan*, NY: Palgrave, p.229

²⁵¹Giustozzi, Antonio (2007), *Koran, Kalashnikov, and Laptop: The Taliban Insurgency in Afghanistan*, UK: Hurst Publishers, p.101

²⁵²Collaborators are those employees or service workers who work with the state and non-state organizations such as engineers, doctors, managers, NGO workers, etc

²⁵³Rashid, Ahmad (2008) *Descent into Chaos*, NY: Penguin Groups: pp.251-252 & Giustozzi, Antonio (2007), *Koran, Kalashnikov, and Laptop: The Taliban Insurgency in Afghanistan*, UK: Hurst Publishers, p.102

²⁵⁴Giustozzi, Antonio (2007), *Koran, Kalashnikov, and Laptop: The Taliban Insurgency in Afghanistan*, UK: Hurst Publishers, p.103

²⁵⁵Ibid., pp.104-105

²⁵⁶Ibid., pp.104-105

²⁵⁷Ibid., p.108

²⁵⁸Giustozzi, Antonio (2007), *Koran, Kalashnikov, and Laptop: The Taliban Insurgency in Afghanistan*, UK: Hurst Publishers, p.116-117

were reported to have been responsible for 942 illegal detentions, 76 cases of property destruction, 439 torture cases, 261 extrajudicial killings, and 410 extortions.²⁵⁹ National Army soldiers have also been accused of few cases of summary executions, and civilian abuses.²⁶⁰ The US and NATO forces reliance on the air strikes accentuates the asymmetrical feature of this war. In 2006, the US forces conducted more than 2,000 air assaults on the insurgents which inflicted a large number of civilian casualties.²⁶¹

Kidnapping and hostage taking for ransom or abduction for money is a novel character of the Taliban insurgency. An Italian aid worker, A German woman and 21 South Korean aid workers are few examples of foreign victims of the Taliban abduction since 2003.²⁶²

3.2- The Diversity of Troops:

3.2.1- The Anti Soviet War:

One of the key features of the 'new war' is diversity of military groups involved in the wars.²⁶³ With the exception of few Arabs, who fought with the Ittehad Party, the anti-Soviet guerrillas were the same type of force.²⁶⁴ ISI and CIA also recruited mercenaries from Pakistan, Egypt, Syria, and Lebanon for the Afghan insurgency.²⁶⁵ On the other side, the Afghan Army and the Soviet forces were supported by a number of paramilitary, self-defense and regional militias.²⁶⁶ Furthermore, a number of border militias fought against guerrilla expansion in their concerned areas.²⁶⁷ Other types of militias were the former rebels who joined the government, and the special

²⁵⁹ Giustozzi, Antonio (2007), *Koran, Kalashnikov, and Laptop: The Taliban Insurgency in Afghanistan*, UK: Hurst Publishers, p.176

²⁶⁰ Ibid., p.188

²⁶¹ Ibid., p. 202

²⁶² Aryn Baker and Ali Safi (Aug 18, 2007), Kidnappers of Kabul, Time, <<http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1654149,00.html>>

²⁶³ Kaldor, Mary (2005), 'Elaborating the "new war" thesis' in Isabelle Duyvesteyn & Jan Angstrom, *Rethinking the Nature of War*, USA: Frank Cass, pp.1-15

²⁶⁴ Edwards, David (2002), 'Before Taliban: genealogies of the Afghan jihad', US: University of California Press, p.269 & Rubin, Barnett(2002) *the Fragmentation of Afghanistan*, USA: Yale University Press, p.183

²⁶⁵ Context of '1986-1992: CIA and British Recruit and Train Militants Worldwide to Help Fight Afghan War' at History Commons: URL <http://www.historycommons.org/context.jsp?item=a86operationcyclone&scale=2#a86operationcyclone>

²⁶⁶ Babur, Imtanan (2008) Lessons of History: Comparison of the Soviet Intervention to the ISAF mission in Afghanistan, *MDS Research Project*, Canadian Force College, pp.25-26

²⁶⁷ Rubin, Barnett(2002) *the Fragmentation of Afghanistan*, USA: Yale University Press, p.144,148

tribal militia, *the Arbakis*.²⁶⁸ The diversity of troops significantly increased after the Soviets withdrawal as various militia forces grew in size and strength (chart-14) and gained autonomy after the withdrawal of the Soviets.²⁶⁹




Chart 13: shows types of military units used beside the Afghan National Army and Soviet forces during the Soviet invasion. There was a sudden raise in the diversity of force after the withdrawal of the Soviet forces in 1989.²⁷⁰

3.2.2- The Diversity of Troops in the Civil War (1990s)

The combatants significantly diversified in the civil war of 1990s as it included the former anti-Soviet Mujahideen groups, the Taliban clergy network, the foreign mercenaries. Rashid wrote about thousands of foreign militants during this war, such as the IMU²⁷¹ Uzbeks, Arabs, Chechens, Kashmiris, Philippines, and Chinese Muslims.²⁷² He says that, Pakistani mercenaries alone were 3000 in one of the battles in the North.²⁷³ As many as 80,000 to 100,000 Pakistani militants fought with the Taliban forces during 1992-1996.²⁷⁴ Foreign Arab volunteers also participated in the Sunni groups' war against the Shi'ite.²⁷⁵ Moreover, a number of Chinese militants from the Uighur ethnic Muslims joined the Taliban in 1999.²⁷⁶

²⁶⁸Rubin, Barnett(2002) *the Fragmentation of Afghanistan*, USA: Yale University Press, p.144,148

²⁶⁹ Ibid., p.158

²⁷⁰Imtanan Babur (2008) *Lessons of History: Comparison of the Soviet Intervention to the ISAF mission in Afghanistan*, MDS Research Project, Canadian Force College, pp.25-26

²⁷¹IMU: Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan militants

²⁷²Rashid, Ahmad (2001), *Taliban*, Oxford: Pan McMillan Ltd. p.80

²⁷³Ibid.. p.80

²⁷⁴Rashid, Ahmad (2001), *Taliban*, Oxford: Pan McMillan Ltd., p.27

²⁷⁵Nojumi, Neamatollah (2002) *The Rise of the Taliban in Afghanistan*, NY: Palgrave, p.113

²⁷⁶ Ibid., p.192

3.2.3- The Diversity of Troops in the Neo-Taliban Insurgency

There are three categories of insurgents in the current neo-Taliban war; 1) the Deobandi Taliban fighters who call themselves the Tahrik-e-Tolaba-i-Islam²⁷⁷; 2) the former anti-Soviet militant groups such as the Hezb-i-Islami of Hekmatyar²⁷⁸; and 3) foreign mercenaries recruited by transnational networks such as Al-Qaeda.²⁷⁹ Whereas, as many as 2000 of these troops have participated in the Taliban insurgency in 2006.²⁸⁰ Also, Pakistani, Arabic, Turkish, Western Chinese and Uzbek forces provide armed support to the neo-Taliban.²⁸¹ Furthermore, Tahir Yoldash's group, an Islamist warlord from Uzbekistan, is fighting against the government and the international forces in Jawazjan province, northern Afghanistan.²⁸² These groups are described in detail in Table 14 (see below).

	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006
Taliban	4,000	7,000	9,500	12,500	17,000
<i>Of which Jaish al Muslimeen</i>			1000	750	<i>Re-absorbed into Taliban?</i>
Hezb-i-Islami	800	1,000	1,000	1,250	1,500
Al Qaida			700	1,000	2,000
Jamaat-ud-Da'awa Al-Salafia Wal Qitaab					90
					joins Hezb-i-Islami in summer 2006
Council of the Secret Army Islamic Revolutionary State of Afghanistan	150	150	150	150	100
Jaish al-Mahdi					low hundreds

Table 14: The diversity of militant groups during the neo-Taliban insurgency and their strength²⁸³

On the side of counterinsurgency, the military force can be divided into two categories: domestic and foreign troops. The domestic force includes the Afghan National Army (ANA), the Afghan National Police (ANP) and four types of Militia forces: 1) Afghan Militia Forces (AMF) controlled by the Ministry of Defense; 2) Special militias hired by the American forces that operate within the vicinities of their

²⁷⁷Giustozzi, Antonio (2007), *Koran, Kalashnikov, and Laptop: The Taliban Insurgency in Afghanistan*, UK: Hurst Publishers, pp.129-131

²⁷⁸Ibid., pp.129-131

²⁷⁹Ibid., pp.129-131

²⁸⁰Ibid., pp.34-35

²⁸¹Rashid,Ahmad (2008) *Descent into Chaos*, NY: Penguin Groups, p.367

²⁸²Benawa Pashto News: Published 26 June, 09, URL: <http://www.benawa.com/details.php?id=27078> translated by Jawaid Samadey-

²⁸³ Giustozzi, Antonio (2007), *Koran, Kalashnikov, and Laptop: The Taliban Insurgency in Afghanistan*, UK: Hurst Publishers, p.132

military bases; 3) private militias of local governors and sub-governors; and 4) the *arbakis*, tribal village militia forces. There are also American security companies such as USPI and DynCorp that lease soldiers to international and national companies.²⁸⁴ The USA also supported most of the warlords in order to fill the military vacuum which resulted from increased American attention to the Iraq war.²⁸⁵

Conclusion:

To conclude this chapter, the three wars possess new military and operational characteristics. The atrocious acts and civilian killings have occurred in all of the three wars; the anti-Soviet insurgency, the civil war and the neo-Taliban insurgency. The Soviets swept off villages and killed civilians to drive-off population from stronghold areas of the insurgents and bombarded villages.²⁸⁶ Amin asserts the heavy assaults were for pushing insurgents to mountains and the rural population to the cities.²⁸⁷ However, the forces were not very diverse in this stage of war and with the exception of few Arabs; the Afghan Mujahideen were the only insurgents.²⁸⁸ The neo-Taliban conflict also shows significant new features in the conduct of war. They promote fear among the population and deliberately kill civilians. The suicide attacks are a distinct example of these atrocities. However, no cases of rape and ethnic cleansing have been recorded so far. Furthermore, the military force is diverse at both sides of the neo-Taliban insurgency.

It will be argued that the civil war resembles the most to the new war phenomenon because civilian casualties, rape, looting and ethnic cleansing together with the rise of very diverse and unorganized militant groups, reached its highest level during this time. Another distinct feature of the civil war, however, is that the civilian casualties and atrocities were committed by both state and non-state parties. As a result, examining certain modes of warfare, it can be argued that all three wars show

²⁸⁴Giustozzi, Antonio (2007), *Koran, Kalashnikov, and Laptop: The Taliban Insurgency in Afghanistan*, UK: Hurst Publishers, pp.166-172

²⁸⁵Rashid, Ahmad (2008) *Descent into Chaos*, NY: Penguin Group, pp.131-135

²⁸⁶McMichael, Scott (1991), *Stumbling Bear: Soviet Military Performance in Afghanistan*, London: Brassey, p.51

²⁸⁷Amin, Tahir (1984) 'Afghan Resistance, Past, Present and Future', *Asian Survey*, Vol.24, No.4, p.388

²⁸⁸Edwards, David (2002), 'Before Taliban: genealogies of the Afghan jihad', US: University of California Press, p.269

operational and military characteristics of the new war but the civil war possesses most of these features (see Table 15).

<i>The Periods of the three wars</i>	<i>Civilian Killings</i>	<i>Rapes</i>	<i>Ethnic cleansing</i>	<i>Plunder</i>	<i>Diversity of Troops</i>
1980s-Soviet Invasion	Significant	Few cases	No	Few cases	To some extent
1990s civil war	Significant	Significant	Significant	Significant	Significant
2000s neo-Taliban	Significant	No	No	Significant	Significant

Table 15: the characteristics of new wars in the three decade wars of Afghanistan

Final Conclusion

The Afghan conflicts have changed over the past thirty years but they do not follow a linear pattern. While the three decades of war in Afghanistan show to some extent characteristics of the new war, the 1990s civil war was the most similar to this phenomenon. A significant trait of the civil war is that in this conflict both state and non-state parties were involved in the illegal economy, ethnic tensions, criminal acts and illicit means for fueling war.

It is worth mentioning that the political, economic and military aspects of the war changed in different patterns. In terms of the politics of war, internal and external factors provided the ground for militant groups in the civil war to promote ethnic and religious identities which resulted in ethnic fragmentation and regionalization of power. In contrast, the anti-Soviet and the neo-Taliban insurgencies were promoted by ideological goals. Although, the state was weak and unpopular in the anti-Soviet and the neo-Taliban wars, it acted as the only ruling administration in the country even though its power was significantly eroded and fragmented during the civil war.

In contrast, the economy of war showed a different trend because the illicit economy and complex resource-flow was more prevalent in the civil war and the neo-Taliban insurgency than during the Soviet invasion.

In terms of the mode of warfare, the three wars were fought by diverse armed groups. However, the civil war was more tyrant and atrocious than the anti-Soviet and neo-Taliban insurgencies. However, a new pattern in the military aspect is promoted by the neo-Taliban insurgency for they create fear and terror amongst the population to achieve their military goals.

This study suggests the following arguments in terms of the theory of the new war:

1. The results of this research support the arguments of Newman that the features of wars are not developing in a linear mode.²⁸⁹ As we discussed, the civil war which

²⁸⁹ Please see page 11 of this paper for Edward Newman's argument about the new wars

took place in the 1990s and after the end of the Cold-War was similar to a typical new warfare, while the wars before and after this period showed only certain features of the new war.

2. The study of the Afghan wars confirms that the conflicts that took place in the aftermath of the Cold War were due to the collapse of the state power and removal of the superpowers' support and that the immediate post-Cold War era was an enabling environment for new warfare which was resulted from the weakness of the state and enhanced role of para-state and transnational actors, who, through promotion of illicit war economy, particularistic politics, and atrocious means, struggled for resources and power.

3. This study suggests that, to some extent, the features of the new war exist in the three wars of Afghanistan. Therefore, it could be suggested that all types of intrastate warfare such as the Cold-War proxy wars, civil wars, and insurgencies demonstrate, to some extent, novel characteristics such as crimes, illicit economy, and ethnic tensions. Therefore, the research confirms the argument of Kalyvas that criminalization and dispersed violence, lack of popular support of the warfare, and the warlords' private and non-military motivations, also existed in the old civil wars.²⁹⁰

4. Another distinct feature of a typical new war is that, due to a gravely eroded state, both state and non-state actors commit atrocious acts, promote illicit economy, and engage in the ethnic conflicts. In contrast, in an insurgency, or Cold-War proxy warfare, these acts are usually carried out by non-state actors.

5. This research has helped to enhance the economic aspect of the thesis of the new warfare which takes place amongst the unorganized state and non-state actors. From the study of the Afghan civil war, it can be argued that the opportunist or noncombatant entrepreneurs take economic benefits from the situation of crisis and war. For example, smugglers pursue drug business, organized criminal groups kidnap and loot, and corrupt government officials receive financial benefits from the drug related businesses.

²⁹⁰ Please see page 11 of this paper for Kalyvas arguments

6. According to the analysis of the illicit economy throughout the three decades of war, it can be suggested that the state is eroded and resource-less in the new wars. For example, the pervasive use of drug revenues in war shows that the ruling Taliban regime was directly involved in the pursuit of illicit means for fueling their wars. It can be argued that in 'new wars', not only non-state groups but also the ruling administrations can be involved in pursuing illicit economy.

7. The above arguments suggest that Kaldor's arguments about the new wars are to some extent valid but it fails to provide a comprehensive understanding of the new wars in all spatiotemporal contexts.

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